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THE PRIVACY OF DEATH ON THE INTERNET: A
LEGITIMATE MATTER OF PUBLIC CONCERN
OR MORBID CURIOSITY
DAVID HAMILL*
INTRODUCTION

Nicole Catsouras was only eighteen-years-old when she crashed her
father's Porsche driving over 100 miles per hour into a toll booth on
October 31, 2006.1 Nicole was decapitated and killed instantly by massive
head trauma. 2 Despite the tremendous grieving process that ensued for the
surviving relatives, something even more devastating subsequently
emerged to challenge their fragile well being. Images of Nicole's accident
scene investigation started proliferating the Internet. 3 These grisly pictures
vividly captured her corpse, half decapitated, seated in her father's
crumpled Porsche Carrera. 4 Once on the Internet, the images aggressively
spread onto as many as 2,500 websites, many of which specialized in
morbid curiosities, 5 and bulletin boards where users can upload content and

* J.D. Candidate, May 2010, St. John's University School of Law; B.S., magna cum laude, St. John's
University, May 2004.
1 Greg Hardesty, Interest in Toll Road Accident Photo Case Rockets After TV Show, ORANGE
CouNTY REG., Dec. 12, 2007, available at http://www.ocregister.com/articles/family-nikki-photos1940703-chp-reich (describing how Nicole took her father's Porsche without permission and crashed
causing her death); Matt Kakley, Trolling for the Grief-Stricken, THE SUN CHRON. ONLINE, Oct. 3,
(stating the
2010, available at http://www.sunchronicle.com/articles/2010/10/03/news/8030111.txt
Nicole, otherwise known as, "Nikki" died in a car accident).
2 Jessica Bennett, A Tragedy That Won't Fade Away, NEWSWEEK, April 25, 2009, available at
http://www.newsweek.com/2009/04/24/a-tragedy-that-won-t-fade-away.html (describing Nicole's head
as having been decapitated); Greg Hardesty, Not Taking Blame, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Jan. 24, 2008,
available at 2008 WLNR 1456481 (stating that her head was mostly missing).
3 See Hardesty, supra note 2 noting that pictures of her corpse began appearing on the internet in
the weeks after her death); Victoria Murphy Barret, Anonymity & the Net, FORBES, Oct. 15, 2007,
available at 2007 WLNR 20255897 (stating that these images appeared on Google, Yahoo, News
Corp.'s Photobucket and many other websites).
4 See Hardesty, supra note 1(referring to the pictures as "graphic"); Barret, supra note 3
(describing the photos to be gruesome); Hardesty, supra note 2 (explaining that the "gory images"
showed the dead woman's face and head mostly missing).
5 See Hardesty, supra note 1 (explaining that some of these websites "specialize in the macabre and
pornographic, as well as morbid curiosities").
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exchange warped opinions. 6 To make matters worse, Nicole's parents and
three younger sisters were tormented by further abuse over the Internet
when they received spain e-mails that contained attached photos of
Nicole's corpse, and noticed fake MySpace.com pages, in which the user
represented himself or herself as Nicole, which were set up after her death. 7
It was later revealed that the source of this outbreak was two California
Highway Patrol (hereinafter CHP) dispatchers, who are now seeking refuge
behind the First Amendment. 8 The lawsuit against the CHP was dismissed
in March, 2008 by the Orange County Superior Court, which held that the
dispatchers had no special duty to protect the privacy of the Catsouras
family. 9 In addition, efforts to have the images removed from the Internet
have been futile,10 and the horrific images remain available for worldwide
consumption.11
6 See Barret, supra note 3 (noting the gruesome photos that ended up in chat rooms and fetishistic
car-crash forums, where anonymous bloggers called Nicole a "spoiled rich girl" who "deserved it"); see
generally DocumentingReality.com, Posting of Nicole Catsouras ( Nikki ) Lost Control Porsche Hits
Toll Booth GORY PICTURES, Face of Death Pictures, http://www.documentingreality.com/forum/fl0/
nicole-catsouras-nikki-lost-control-porsche-hits-toll-booth-gory-pictures-1248/
(last visited Oct.10,
2010) (sharing warped opinions including "[d]ang, she messed up her hair pretty badly" and calling
Nicole a "teenie-bopping-zit-squisher").
7 See Barret, supra note 3 (stating that Nicole's father, Christos Catsouras, received an email from
an anonymous Yahoo account "Im Alive[sic]" that read "[w]hoooooooooo I am here daddy." Nicole's
mother, Leslie Catsouras, was horrified when she accidentally stumbled upon the accident images while
on the Internet searching through an article on her daughter's death stating. "I've spent 41 years seeing
good in the world. Now I see the bad," she stated); see also Hardesty, supra note 1 (explaining that the
taunting got so bad for Nicole's sixteen-year-old sister Danielle that she had to be home-schooled).
8 See Hardesty, supra note 1 (commenting that Thomas O'Donnell of the CHP admitted to emailing the photos to his home computer and Aaron Reich of the CHP admitted to e-mailing the photos
to a few friends and relatives); Reynolds Holding, Family Can Sue Caif Highway Patrol for Letting
Daughter's Accident Photos Spread Online, ABC NEWS, Feb. 2, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw
/nicole-catsouras-fatal-accident-photos-web-family-sue/story?id=9731639&page=3 (stating that "[a]fter
an internal investigation, the California Highway Patrol identified two dispatchers, O'Donnell and
Reich, as being responsible for the leaked images.").
9 See Ron Gonzales, Appeal Over Graphic Photos Fuels Response, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Aug.
28, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 16666057 (noting that the Catsouras family is currently appealing
the decision in a state appellate court claiming "the right to seek damages from the CHP because the
agency made public what should have remained private, subjecting them to deep emotional anguish");
Bennett, supra note 2 (stating that the Catsourases have appealed the court's decision). But see
Catsouras v. Dep't of Cal. Highway Patrol, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352, 377 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (holding
that O'Donnell and Reich had a duty to the plaintiffs because of the particular circumstances of the
case).
10 See Hardesty, supra note 1 (stating that the family hired a company called "Reputation
Defender, to try to get Web site operators to take down the offensive images"); Bennett, supra note 2, at
38 (discussing how attempts to remove the images from the intemet, which included issuing cease-anddesist letters as well as making the images harder to find in a Google search, were unsuccessful).
11 Navigating the Internet using Google's search engine at www.google.com with the keywords
"Nicole Catsouras," "Porsche Girl," or "Accident Photos" will yield results that include the gruesome
images of Nicole's corpse. Some websites show body parts and her decapitated. http://www.google.
com/search?source=ig&hl=en&rlz-l GlGGLQENUS293&=&q-Nikki+Catsouras&aq=f&aqi=&aql=
&oq=&gs rfai= (last visited Oct. 10 2010) . See, e.g., http://www.nikkicatsouras.net (last visited Oct.
102010).
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The anguish that the Catsouras family has endured illustrates the dark
possibilities that the Internet enables and the seemingly inadequate
protection that privacy law provides. First, the websites that contain posts
of these images and manage their own content can invoke the First
Amendment and declare the photographs newsworthy.1 2 Second, Internet
Service Providers (hereinafter ISPs) are currently absolved from liability
under the Communications Decency Act (hereinafter CDA) and will
therefore refuse to remove material generated by users on Internet bulletin
boards and other forums where users interact and dictate content. 13 Finally,
the right to privacy after death remains a controversial and emotionally
charged unsettled area of law. Although common law has predominantly
established that the right to privacy dies with the decedent,14 the Supreme
Court decision in National Archives and Records Administration v.

Favishl5 and several state statutes limiting access to autopsy photographs
promote the adoption of stronger privacy protection safeguards in response
to our voyeuristic culture.16
Privacy is an important right in the context of death and should be
afforded some measure of protection against public exploitation. To the

12 See generally Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489-91 (1975) (finding that the tort of
public disclosure of private fact "most directly confront[s] the constitutional freedoms of speech and
press." As a result, the interest in privacy can sometimes be "overborne by the larger public interest,
secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth"); Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711, 714 (N.C.
1988) (commenting that there exists a tension between privacy laws and the First Amendment).
13 The Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F.
Supp. 44, 53 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that America Online, as an ISP, was not liable for making an
allegedly defamatory gossip column available to its subscribers).
14 See generally Justice v. Belo Broad. Corp., 472 F. Supp. 145, 147 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (relying on
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521 (1977)); Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 187 Cal.App.3d 1463,
1485 (Ct. App. 1986) (stating that "the right [of privacy] does not survive but dies with the person.");
Smith v. City of Artesia, 772 P.2d 373, 375 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989) (noting that a "cause of action for
unreasonable publicity concerning one's private life belongs solely to the one who was the subject of
the publicity."); Swickard v. Wayne County Med. Exam'r, 475 N.W.2d 304, 309 (Mich. 1991) (holding
that a cause of action for invasion of privacy cannot be maintained after the death of the individual
whose privacy has been invaded); Williams v. City of Minneola, 575 So.2d 683, 689 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1991) (asserting that "an invasion of privacy action ... can be brought only by a living person
whose own privacy is invaded."); Long v. American Red Cross, 145 F.R.D. 658, 666 (S.D. Ohio 1993)
(noting that "the law does not generally recognize that any third party, even a close family member, has
a legally protectable interest in keeping private information known about another family member");
Savala v. Freedom Comm'ns, Inc., 2006 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5609, at *22 (Ct. App. 2006)
(stating that "[i]t is well settled that the right of privacy is purely a personal one; it cannot be asserted
by anyone other than the personal whose privacy has been invaded").
15 541 U.S. 157, 170 (2004) (finding the decedent's relatives have a valid privacy claim).
16 See Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae and Brief of Amicus Curiae Teresa Earnhardt in
Support of Petitioner at 24, Office of Indep. Counsel v. Favish, 124 S.Ct. 2198 (2003) (No. 02-954)
(listing states that allow only limited access to autopsy records); Clay Calvert, The Privacy ofDeath: An
Emergent Jurisprudenceand Legal Rebuke to Media Exploitation and a Voyeuristic Culture, 26 LOY.
L.A. ENT. L. REv. 133, 133 (2005-2006) (noting that "privacy is increasingly sacrificed in our
voyeuristic, tabloid-journalism culture").
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contrary, the Internet has turned our right to privacy upside down by
disguising gruesome images of death as a matter of public interest. In
doing so the Internet has created a virtual graveyard where accident videos
can be viewed and corpses can be closely scrutinized under the protection
of the First Amendment. This explicit content represents a quantum leap
from the standard obituary or the occasional article containing a
photograph of the deceased. Often devoid of informative value, these
digital images present a challenge to our privacy law that is unlike anything
our courts have had to face in coming to prior holdings.1 7 For this reason,
it is necessary for the courts and legislators to reconsider the right to
privacy in this narrow context and to carefully tailor a law that properly
balances the interests at stake.
This Note will argue for a stronger privacy right for decedents and their
relatives with respect to Internet publications of death-images. The
depictions warranting greater protection under this Note will include those
that capture images of a decedent's autopsy, corpse, cause of death or
manner by which he or she died, body parts of the deceased, or any other
depiction that portrays the decedent's actual death. In order to achieve
sufficient protection for relatives, this Note proposes a necessary
amendment to the CDA that affords decedent's relatives proper recourse
when seeking the removal of death-images generated by third-parties. In
addition, this Note offers a two-part test for courts to implement when
analyzing the newsworthiness of death- images published by information
content providers who are outside the scope of the CDA.18 Part I discusses
the historical treatment of the right to privacy after death, and highlights the
disparity among courts in striking a balance. Part II examines the privacy
of death over the Internet, including the current system that abrogates ISP
liability. Part III provides a critique of the current status of the law and its
deficiency in providing sufficient protection. Finally, Part IV proposes an
amendment to the CDA and a two-part test for courts to implement when
17 In dealing with the right to privacy and the impact of death upon that right in other mediums,
courts are frequently exposed to circumstances that are factually distinct from exploitation on the
Internet. Compare Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1484 (noting decedent's wife's right to privacy prevailed
over the First Amendment where an NBC news crew broadcast the decedent's heart attack on the 6 p.m.
and 11 p.m. news as part of a documentary on paramedics) with Hendrickson v. Cal. Newspapers, Inc.,
48 Cal. App. 3d 59, 62-63 (Ct. App. 1975) (asserting that the relatives of the decedent could not
maintain a privacy cause of action where newspaper obituary revealed prior criminal conviction of
deceased); and Flynn v. Higham, 149 Cal. App. 3d 677, 683 (Ct. App. 1983) (stating that the decedent's
relatives could not maintain a privacy cause of action arising from a book that referred to the sexual and
political activities of their deceased father).
18 See discussion infra Part III.A.2 (discussing how websites are protected under the First
Amendment and have a high probability of avoiding accountability if they publish newsworthy
content).
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dealing with issues of privacy and death on the Internet.
I. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

The right against "publicity given to private life" has been a recognized
privacy interest in our jurisprudence for over one-hundred years.1 9 Today,
almost every state has codified some variation of the constitutional right to
nondisclosure of personal matters, 20 . or at least has accepted it as a
cognizable right under the common law. 2 1 Under the commonly adopted
Restatement Second of Torts, the right is defined as:
[o]ne who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if
the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to
a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the
public. 22
Given its potential conflict with the First Amendment's protection of
freedom of the press, the foundation of this privacy right is often contingent
upon the newsworthiness of the disclosure. 23 Hence, the element critical in
most cases dealing with the public disclosure of private facts is "the
presence or absence of legitimate public interest" or the "newsworthiness
[of] the facts disclosed." 24 In weighing these interests, the Restatement is
clear in making the distinction between giving publicity to information to
which the public is entitled, and giving publicity to information that
19 See, e.g., Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 24-25 (N.Y. 1895) (examiningg the plaintiff's claim to
a right of privacy and when such a right may or may not apply); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D.
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L REv. 193, 195 (1890) (highlighting the concern over the
press' frequent intrusion into private matters); William L. Prosser, Privacy,48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 389
(1960) (categorizing and defining the four basic privacy interests later used in the Restatement Second
of Torts, including "[p]ublic disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff').
20 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977) (holding there is a right to privacy either in
the Fourteenth Amendment or the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people);
McCambridge v. City of Little Rock, 766 S.W.2d 909, 913-14 (Ark. 1989) (asserting that most federal
courts have recognized a constitutional right to nondisclosure of personal matters).
21 See, e.g., Justice v. Belo Broad. Corp., 472 F. Supp. 145, 148 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (holding that
Texas recognizes the tort of public disclosure of private fact); Williams v. City of Minneola, 575 So.2d
683, 686-87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that Florida grants some protection against privacy tort
liability). See also Peter Gielniak, Tipping the Scales: Courts Struggle to Strike a Balance Between the
Public Disclosure of Private Facts Tort and the First Amendment, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1217,
1225 (1999) (noting the historical origin of the right to privacy and its acceptance as a common law
cause of action throughout the country).
22 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
23 See, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 490 (1975) (upholding the press's right to
publish a seventeen-year-old rape victim's identity that had already appeared in the public record). See
also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967) (holding that the Constitution protected a publisher
from action under a New York defamation law).
24 Savala v. Freedom Comm'ns, Inc., 2006 WL 1738169, at *5 (Cal.App. 5 Dist. 2006).
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"becomes a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own
sake," and with which a reasonable member of the public would admit is of
no concern. 2 5 Section A explains the historical treatment by courts handling
a private facts action brought by decedent's relatives. Section B introduces
new trends in the law that encourage a greater privacy right for decedent's
relatives. Finally, Section C juxtaposes the two diverging applications of
the law concerning the right to privacy after death.
A. The CourtsHistoricalApproach Dealing with the PrivacyofDeath
Generally courts have been unwilling to extend the right of privacy to
decedents or their relatives. 26 Following this tradition, courts have
recognized two significant factors when rejecting a cause of action for
invasion of privacy. First, as a threshold matter, courts have predominantly
found that the right of privacy is personal and extinguishes upon death. 27
Second, assuming the plaintiff overcomes this privacy threshold, he or she
would still need to prevail against the ubiquitous and heavily weighted First
Amendment newsworthy element. 28
Taking the preceding factors into account, plaintiffs have often conceded
their right(s) to privacy in the interests of the public's right to know. 2 9 For
instance, in Savala v. Freedom Communications, Inc., the plaintiffs
commenced an action for invasion of privacy after a crime scene
25 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (1977) (noting this limitation is based
upon decency, and respecting both the feelings of the individual and the harm that will result from
exposure).
26 See Belo Broad. Corp., 472 F. Supp. at 147 (holding that the plaintiffs could not bring a
representative action for the invasion of their deceased son's privacy because the right is personal and
not assignable); Smith v. City of Artesia, 772 P.2d 373, 375 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989) (ruling that the right
to privacy is personal and could only be maintained by a living person); Swickard v. Wayne County
Med. Exam'r, 475 N.W.2d 304, 310 (Mich. 1991) (holding that the right to privacy cause of action
could not be maintained after the death of the person whose privacy had been invaded); Long v.
American Red Cross, 145 F.R.D. 658, 665 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (noting that the privacy interest
extinguishes upon death); Williams v. City of Minneola, 575 So.2d 683, 689 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(asserting that the right to privacy is personal and an action could only be brought by the person whose
privacy was invaded).
27 See Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 187 Cal.App.3d 1463, 1485 (Ct. App. 1986) (stating that the right
of privacy does not survive but "dies with the person"); Flynn v. Higham, 149 Cal.App.3d 677, 683 (Ct.
App. 1983) (holding that a plaintiff can only bring an action regarding his own privacy).
28 E.g., Shulman v. Group W Prods. Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 478-79 (Cal. 1998) (stating that the
plaintiff has the burden to prove the alleged private facts lack any newsworthy value). See Diaz v.
Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 768 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that newsworthiness of
facts must be proven by the plaintiff).
29 E.g., Savala, 2006 WL 1738169, at *5(noting that the privacy analysis "incorporates
considerable deference to reporters and editors, avoiding the likelihood of unconstitutional interference
with the freedom of the press to report truthfully on matters of legitimate public interest"). See,
Shulman, 955 P.2d at 485 (noting it is not for the jury or the judge to state to decide the best way to
report a story, thus giving news reporters and editors considerable deference).
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photograph of their relative's corpse had appeared in an end-of-the-year
newspaper article about the number of shootings that took place in the
city. 30 First, the court found the subject of violent crime to be a matter of
legitimate public concern. 3 1 Next, the court held that the crime scene
photograph had "some substantial relevance" to that subject. Despite its
controversial depiction, the court was unwilling to "sit as superior editors
of the press" and question the newspaper's protected decision to publish
such content. 32 Upon rejecting the plaintiffs claims, the court reinforced
the personal nature of the privacy interest invoked, stating that the claim
"cannot be asserted by anyone other than the person whose privacy has
been invaded." 33
The Savala case reflects a longstanding principle accepted by most
courts dealing with the privacy rights of the deceased and their relatives. 34
Savala also represents the rare occasion where the court explained its
reasoning for finding the content newsworthy rather than summarily
rejecting the plaintiffs claim. In its analysis, the court highlighted the
importance of showing great deference to the press while defining the
parameters of what constitutes matters of legitimate public concern.
Reluctant to become a substitute editor of the press, the court employed an
extremely deferential "substantial relevance" standard. 35 Under this
standard, the court will allow the disclosure of content with "some
substantial relevance" to a subject of legitimate public concern. 36 It is,
however, uncertain just how attenuated the logical nexus will have to
become before the court finds the content irrelevant to the public's interest.
B. The Trend Towards Afording GreaterProtection
The Supreme Court's decision in National Archives and Records
Administration v. Favish suggests a change in tide for privacy interests that
may ultimately result in greater rights for decedents and their relatives
30 Savala, 2006 WL 1738169, at *1.
31 Id. at *7 ("There appears to be no dispute the general subject of violent crime in Porterville is a
matter of legitimate public concern.").
32 Id.
33 Id. at *8.
34 See, e.g., cases citied supra note 26 (holding that privacy causes of action can only be
maintained by living persons).
35 Shulman v. Group W Prods. Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 486 (Cal. 1998)) (implementing the same
standard, the court noted that there must be a "logical relationship or nexus" between the facts disclosed
and the event that brought the person into the public eye).
36 See Savala, 2006 WL 1738169, at* 7 (emphasis added) (stating that the standard is not whether
the alleged private content is essential to the story or "whether its publication could have offended some
readers").

840

JOURNAL OFCIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMCDEVELOPENT

[Vol.25:4

under the common law. 37 In addition, almost every state has now enacted
specific laws rendering autopsy photographs confidential. 38 This response
is due in part to the challenges that recent technology has presented in the
context of the privacy of death. 39 Both courts and legislators are showing
concern for the potential injury that technology can cause by exploiting
death and offending the privacy of the surviving family. 40
In Favish, the Court dealt with a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
action brought after the Office of Independent Counsel (OIC) refused the
plaintiff's request for ten death-scene photographs of Vincent Foster's body
compiled during a government investigation. 4 1 The refusal was based on
FOIA exemption 7(C), which excuses disclosure of material that would
result in "an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 4 2 First, the Court
held that the statute's personal privacy protection extended to Vincent
Foster's family. 43 The Court noted that "[f]amily members have a personal
stake in honoring and mourning their dead and objecting to unwarranted
public exploitation." 44 Recognizing the family's stake in the matter, 45 the
37 541 U.S. 157 (2004).
38 See Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 16, at 23 (listing states that have enacted laws restricting
"public access to autopsy photographs"); Samuel A. Terilli & Sigman L. Splichal, Public Access to
Autopsy and Death-Scene Photographs:Relational Privacy,Public Records and Avoidable Collisions,
10 COMM. L. & POL'Y 313, 341-342 (recognizing that state access laws are now highly influenced by
our concern for privacy in the age of the Internet and digital technology).
39 See Nat'l Archives and Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 167 (2004) (highlighting the
family's fear of their relative's suicide photos being disseminated by media and consumed on the
Internet); Campus Commc'ns v. Earnhardt, 821 So.2d 388, 393 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that
the dissemination of autopsy photographs increases the chances of "exacerbation of [familial] injury in
light of the ever increasing use of the Internet and the proliferation of personal computers.").
40 See id. at 170-71; Earnhardt v. Volusia County, 2001 WL 992068 at *3-5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2001)
(noting the trial court's concern for Dale Earnhardt's autopsy photographs being posted on the world
wide web. The publication and unnecessary inspection of such content on the web constitutes an
extraordinary invasion of personal privacy of the decedent's surviving family); Brief of Amicus Curiae,
supra note 16, at 23-24 (explaining that the Florida Legislature's statute protecting autopsy
photographs was enacted in response to the exploitation of such content over the Internet. Following
Florida, the following States also have enacted similar protective measures against accessing autopsy
photographs: Alaska, California, Delaware, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Iowa,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, Arkansas, Arizona,
Colorado, Hawaii, Michigan, Illinois, Mississippi, Montana, Missouri, Nevada, Nebraska, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, South Dakota, Vermont, Wisconsin and Virginia).
41 Favish, 541 U.S. at 161 (Vincent Foster, Jr., deputy counsel to President Clinton, had committed
suicide. Respondent Favish was skeptical of the Government's investigation concerning the nature of
his death and wished to administer his own investigation).
42 Id. at 160-61 (quoting the language of 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C)).
43 Id. at 163 ("[T]he statute's protection 'extends to the memory of the deceased held by those tied
closely to the deceased by blood or love."' (quoting Favish v. Office of Indep. Counsel, 217 F.3d 1168
(9th Cir. 2000))).
44 Id. at 168.
45 Id. ("[T]his well-established cultural tradition acknowledging a family's control over the body
and death images of the deceased has long been recognized at common law.").
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Court invoked an early decision by the New York Court Appeals 46
reigniting an old common law principle that surviving relatives have a right
to protect the memory of the deceased. 4 7 Having established the family's
right to privacy, the Court held that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient
evidence to warrant disclosure and outweigh the countervailing privacy
interest at stake. 48
The holding in Favish was not a complete departure from prior court
decisions concerning the privacy of death in a FOIA action. 4 9 For example,
in New York Times Co. v. National Aeronautics and Space ,50 the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia rejected a FOIA request
for the audio tapes from the Challenger space shuttle, which captured the
astronaut's last words, holding that the privacy rights of the family
members outweighed the public's interest in access. 5 1 Also, in Badhwar v.
U.S. Dep't of Air Force,52 the D.C. Circuit Court refused a FOIA request
for autopsy photographs of deceased pilots, finding that such disclosure
would "shock the sensibilities of surviving kin" and was a "clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 53
In addition to the foregoing pro-privacy holdings, several states have
proactively implemented protective legislation in a similar context; 54 that
is, legislation that restricts access to, or release of, autopsy photographs or
information obtained in a government investigation. Florida, for example,
has strongly considered the repercussions of this sensitive content
46 See Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 25 (1895) (holding that individual right of privacy expires
upon the death of the individual).
47 Id. at 26 (stating that "it is the right of the living, and not of the dead, which is recognized").
48 See Favish, 541 U.S. at 175 ("Favish has not produced any evidence that would warrant a belief
by a reasonable person that the alleged Government impropriety might have occurred to put the balance
into play.").
49 See Katz v. Nat'l Archives and Records Admin., 68 F.3d 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (refusing to
allow the release of the autopsy photographs of former President John F. Kennedy and recognizing the
privacy right of both the decedent and his family); Hale v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 973 F.2d 894, 900 (10"
Cir. 1992) (preventing the disclosure of photographs of a deceased victim, recognizing the personal
privacy interest of a victim's family).
50 782 F.Supp. 628 (D.D.C. 1991).
51 Id at 631 ("NASA does not dispute that the substantive information contained in the tape is
technical and non-personal. Rather, the 'intimate detail' that underlies the privacy interest in this tape is
the sound of the astronauts' voices. Exposure to the voice of a beloved family member immediately
prior to that family member's death is what would cause the Challenger families pain.").
52 829 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
53 Id. at 185-86.
54 See Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 16, at 23-25 ("Most states now restrict public access to
autopsy photographs ... the trend seems to be to follow the reasoning of the FOIA and the new Florida
statute, by balancing intrusion upon privacy against the public interest of disclosure."); Samuel A.
Terilli & Sigman L. Splichal, Public Access to Autopsy and Death-Scene Photographs: Relational
Privacy, Public Records and Avoidable Collisions, 10 COMM. L. & POL'Y 313, 315 n.4 (2005)
("Outrage over the Earnhardt case spawned efforts in other states ... to enact restrictive legislation.").
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proliferating over the World Wide Web, expressing concern over the ease
with which material is disseminated for mass consumption. 55 To combat
this exploitation, Florida only permits the disclosure of autopsy
photographs, videotapes, and recordings if "a court finds good cause" and
the right to immediate disclosure remains with the family of the deceased. 5 6
Mindful of the dangers presented by the Internet, forty-three states now
follow the basic policy and reasoning underlying Florida's statute. 57
C. The Present Conflict Between Courts Balancing the Interests Involved
Despite this recent support for protecting the privacy rights of the
deceased, there still remains an irreconcilable difference amongst courts
dealing with this issue. 58 Under the common law, the right of privacy does
not survive death; however, in a FOIA action, courts have not only
recognized the relative's right to proceed with his or her claim, but have
found his or her interest prevail against the public's right to access. To
illustrate, the court in Savala expressly dismissed the application of the
holding in Favish, stating the existing distinction between the common law
and the FOIA exemption statute: "[t]he privacy interest recognized in
Favish was a creature of statute not common law." 59 That is, the statutory
interpretation of privacy under the FOIA is not analogous to the tort action
for invasion of privacy under the common law. 6 0 Distinguishing the two
55 See Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 16, at 23. ("The Florida Legislature specifically
expressed its concern about the worldwide web and the potential for widespread dissemination of
autopsy photographs."); 2001 Fla. Laws, ch. 2001-1, § 2, available at http://laws.flrules.org/2001/1
("The Legislature notes that the existence of the World Wide Web ... encourages and promotes the
wide dissemination of photographs and video and audio recordings 24 hours a day and that widespread
unauthorized dissemination of autopsy photographs and video and audio recordings would subject the
immediate family of the deceased to continuous injury.").
56 The right to immediate disclosure remains with the decedent's spouse and other specified family
members. See Fla. Stat. § 406.135 (2010) (prescribing restrictions on autopsy photographs, video and
audio recordings).
57 See Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 16, at 20a-23a (noting that only Alabama, Idaho,
Kansas, Kentucky, New Mexico, North Carolina and Wyoming have no restrictions on public access);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 130A-389 (2010) (stating that North Carolina allows for most members of the public
to obtain report upon request).
58 Compare Nat'l Archives and Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 167 (2004) (recognizing
a privacy claim for decedent's relatives and holding that the right to privacy outweighed the interest in
disclosure), and Providence Journal Co. v. Town W. Warwick, 2004 R.I. Super. LEXIS 136, at *12
(R.I. Jul. 22, 2004) (denying disclosure of 911 emergency calls made by the dying victims of a fire at
West Warwick nightclub, the court recognized "the privacy interests and dignity of the victims and their
family members"), with Miller v. National Broad.Co., 187 Cal.App.3d 1463, 1485 (Ct. App. 1986)
(stating that the right to privacy "does not survive but dies with the person"), and Savala v. Freedom
Commc'ns Inc. 2006 WL 1738169, at *8-9 (Cal. App. 5 Dist. 2006) (recognizing the press's right to
publish a murder scene photograph of plaintiff's brother).
59 Savala, 2006 WL 1738169 at *9.
60 See id. (explaining the common law and statutory distinction between privacy interests).
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cases, the Savala court went on to explain that the privacy interest in
Favish was also not balanced against the constitutional right of the press to
publish newsworthy information.6 1
The court in Savala overstates its differences from Favish and overlooks
the Supreme Court's analysis interpreting the right to privacy in the FOIA
Exemption. Although the Court in Favish observed that "the statutory
privacy right protected by Exemption 7(C) goes beyond the common law
and the Constitution" 62 in extracting the statute's meaning, the Court cited
several common law principles and cultural traditions to support its
holding. 63 For instance, the Court in Favish alluded to several state court
cases that recognized the right to privacy of decedent's relatives under the
common law. 64 Next the Court referred to several "well-established
cultural tradition[s]" in our society that support an absolute right of family
members to protect the privacy of the deceased. 65 Synthesizing our case
law and cultural traditions, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress'
use of the term "personal privacy" was "intended to permit family members
to assert their own privacy rights against public intrusions." 66 It is therefore
unclear why the court in Savala failed to consider this portion of the Favish
analysis that relied heavily on the common law and conventional norms.
The court in Savala was correct in distinguishing Favish for not dealing
with the constitutional implications of a newsworthy defense. 6 7 However,
61 See id. In Favish, it was not the press requesting the death-scene photographs, but was an
independent investigator. See Favish, 541 U.S. at 161.
62 Id. at 170.
63 See id at 167 (citing such common law principles and traditional rights as authority for the right
to control the disposition of the deceased's body and the right to restrict exploitive photographs of the
deceased). See also Crawford v. J. Avery Bryan Funeral Home, Inc., 253 S.W.3d 149, 159-60 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2007) (recognizing a surviving spouse's common law right to control disposition of the
deceased's body).
64 See Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 25 (N.Y. 1895) (recognizing the privacy right of surviving
relatives to protect the memory of the deceased); Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 155 S.E. 194, 197 (Ga.
1930) (recognizing the parents' right to privacy in photographs of their deceased child's body); Reid v.
Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333, 342 (Wash. 1998) (holding that "the immediate relatives of a decedent
have a protectable privacy interest in the autopsy records of the decedent."); McCambridge v. Little
Rock, 766 S.W.2d 909, 914-15 (Ark. 1989) (recognizing a murder victim's mother's privacy interest in
crime scene photographs). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b, illus. 7 (1977)
(stating that the publication of a photograph of a deceased infant "child with two heads" in a newspaper
against the parent's objection would result in an invasion of the parent's privacy).
65 See Favish, 541 U.S. at 167-69 (finding in "our case law and traditions" the right to honor our
deceased relatives, to preserve the memory and integrity of the deceased, control the disposition of the
body, prevent others from exploiting pictures of the deceased and to respectfully mourn their deaths).
66 Id. at 167.
67 Compare Savala v. Freedom Commc'ns Inc., 2006 WL 1738169, at *9 (Cal. App. 5 Dist. 2006)
(noting that the privacy interest recognized in Favish "did not implicate the same counterbalancing
constitutional considerations protecting the right of the press to publish newsworthy information") with
Favish, 541 U.S. at 174 (identifying the counterbalancing public interest in the case as a citizen's
suspicion that "responsible officials acted negligently or otherwise improperly .... ).
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the Court in Favish did consider briefs of amici curiae from several
interested parties of the press before rendering its decision. 6 8 Moreover, the
court in Savala failed to consider the holding in National Aeronautics
where the United States District Court for the District of Columbia did
consider the right of the press in a FOIA action, and precluded the New
York Times' access to content that would offend the privacy right of the
decedent's relatives. 69
II. THE PRIVACY OF DEATH ON THE INTERNET

"Free speech on the Internet is not for the faint of heart." 70 As is the case
with Nicole Catsouras, the Internet's power can be easily misused to
exploit the privacy, memory, and integrity of a decedent. 7 1 A casual perusal
of the Internet using a search engine and search terms like "horrible death
pictures" or "horrible deaths caught on tape" will quickly introduce a user
to an unimaginable world of second-hand death. 72 Although the television
news media has pushed the boundary on sensationalizing death as a matter
of public interest, 73 the Internet's exploitation of death presents a far
greater challenge to our privacy in the future. 74 These depictions do not

68 See generally Brief for Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent, Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (No. 02-954) (arguing that an adverse decision could
have a substantial impact on the press in reporting upon matters of legitimate public interest); Brief for
Silha Center for the Study of Media Ethics and Law as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Favish,
541 U.S. 157 (No. 02-954) (reasoning that "survivor privacy" does not exist under the Freedom of
Information Act).
69 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 782 F. Supp. 628, 631-33 (D.D.C.
1991) (finding that the press' interest in obtaining the tapes in order to inform the public did not
outweigh the private interests of the family).
70 Gary D. Nissenbaum & Laura J. Freedman, Wrongful Posting on the Internet, 251 N.J. LAW.
MAG. 20, 20 (Apr. 2008).
71 See Hardesty, supra note 1 (describing the anguish suffered by the decedent's family upon
release of decedent's accident photos on the internet.); Jon Mills, A Privacy Right for Web, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 23, 2010, at 9A ("Today's toxic mix of easy access to digital photos, easy
global distribution via the Internet and the ability to distribute anonymously is a perfect storm for
horrible intrusions.").
72 See generally Google Home Page, http://www.google.com (search engine enabling users to
navigate the Internet); Bing Home Page, http://www.bing.com (another search engine enabling internet
navigation).
73 See, e.g., Calvert, supra note 16, at 145 (discussing comments made by Robert Alt concerning
the publication of death-images from Iraq, stating that it was "macabre voyeurism-masquerading-asnews"); Jonah Goldberg, Media Missteps, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, May 7, 2004, http://old.nationalreview
.com/goldberg/goldberg20045O7O940.asp (describing how media outlets exploit death in their
broadcasts to serve themselves.)
74 See The Nature of the Internet is Distinct from Other Forms of Media infra Part III.B (explaining
the differing characteristics between the internet and other sources of media in terms of applying the
First Amendment privacy protections); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 48 n.7 (D.D.C. 1998)
(discussing the difficulties in pinning down the locations of internet exchanges).

2011]

THEPRWACYOFDEATH ON THE NTERAET

845

represent victimless crimes 75 and most often do not present more than the
death-images themselves. 76 Yet they remain protected by the First
Amendment without regard to their social or informative value and without
respect for the surviving family. Section A discusses the First Amendment
implications surrounding the regulation of death-images on the Internet,
while Section A. 1 illustrates the impact that the Communications Decency
Act has had on regulating such content. Section B examines the First
Amendment newsworthy counterbalance to the public disclosure of private
facts. Finally, Section C describes the depictions of death that are currently
flourishing over the Internet.
A. The FirstAmendment Implications
The Internet offers distinct advantages that make it superior to other
forms of communication 77 and regulating death-images may have a broadsweeping effect on eroding its informative value. 78 Nevertheless, freedom
of speech is not absolute and does not receive total immunity from
regulation. 79 Often, the First Amendment must be weighed against
75 See, e.g., David Wilkes, The Internet Ghouls Who Glory in Our Girl's Suicide, DAILY MAIL,
Mar. 20, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 5423616 (commenting upon 16-year-old Chelsea Smith's
suicide after her photograph appeared on www.findadeath.com on the site's "top ten deaths" in a
section called "suicide by rope"); Lad's Murder Screened on Vile Websites, PEOPLE UK, June 18,
2006, available at 2006 WLNR 10515790 (noting the stabbing of 20-year-old Daniel Pollen was
featured on several "sick US websites").
76 Often these websites just portray gruesome images with little to no textual reference, or any
information that highlights a factual context. See, e.g., Everwonder.com, World of Death,
http://www.everwonder.com/david/worldofdeath (last visited Oct. 10, 2010). These images are brought
together in large galleries that lack substantial factual context. See Documenting Reality, Can You
Handle Reality?, http://www.documentingreality.com/forum (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
77 See Amanda Groover Hyland, The Taming of the Internet: A New Approach to Third-Party
Defamation, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 79, 109-11 (2008) (noting that the Internet does not
make access contingent upon political, social or economic clout, its inclusiveness has allowed the
"lonely pamphleteer" to communicate and interact on a global scale at the speed of light. Web site
operators, interactive blogs, chat rooms, and bulletin boards all contribute to "the most expansive" and
"barrier-free marketplace of ideas ever to exist."); Katelyn Y. A. McKenna et al., Relationship
Formation on the Internet: What's the Big Attraction?, 58 J. OF Soc. ISSUES 9, 9-13 (2002) (discussing
how the qualities of Internet communication and interaction are known to produce greater social
connections in a more efficient manner).
78 See e.g., Clay Calvert, Voyeur War? The FirstAmendment, Privacy & Images From the War on
Terrorism, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 147, 149 (recognizing the inherent political
and social value that may result from death-images in times of war); Kenneth Irby, War Images as
Eyewitness, POYNTER ONLINE, May 10, 2004, http://www.poynter.org/content/contentprint.asp?id=
65426 (last visited Oct. 10, 2010) (noting historic examples of war time images and the impact these
type of images can have on consciousness and policy).
79 See R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992) ("From 1791 to the present,
however, our society, like other free but civilized societies, has permitted restrictions upon the content
of speech in a few limited areas, which are 'of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality' . . . .
We have recognized that 'the freedom of speech' referred to by the First Amendment does not include a
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countervailing societal interests and balanced accordingly.80 In Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire,8 1 the Supreme Court established a framework for
identifying categories of unprotected speech. There, the Court allowed
content-based restrictions on speech in limited categories which are "of
such slight social value as to step the truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality." 8 2 Applying this standard, courts have separated "low level
speech" that deserves a "subordinate position in the scale of First
Amendment values" and afforded this content lesser protection. 83 Under
this pretext, courts will have to determine the value of death-images under
the First Amendment and regulate the Internet appropriately.
Attempts to regulate speech on the Internet have been futile, and are
often met with a strong sentiment that the Internet should remain
"uninhibited, robust, and wide open." 84 Courts have found that the First
Amendment standard varies depending upon the characteristics of the new
media; and therefore, different mediums demand different scrutiny. 85 In

freedom to disregard these traditional limitations" (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 572 (1942))); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) ("It is a fundamental principle, long
established, that the freedom of speech and of the press which is secured by the Constitution, does not
confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an
unrestricted and unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents
the punishment of those who abuse this freedom").
80 See generally Constitutional Law - First Amendment - En Banc Third Circuit Strikes Down
Federal Statute Prohibiting the Interstate Sale of Depictions of Animal Cruelty - United States v.
Stevens, 533 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2008) (en banc), 122 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1243-45 (2009) (discussing
the Chaplinsky countervailing interest test, which relies on a category-specific analysis); City of Los
Angeles et al. v. Preferred Commc'ns, Inc. 476 U.S. 488, 495 (1986) (noting that "where speech and
conduct are joined in a single course of action, the First Amendment values must be balanced against
competing societal interests").
81 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (noting that "[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting
or 'fighting' words -- those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace").
82 Idat 572.
83 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the FirstAmendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV.
189, 194 (1983) (commenting that express incitement, obscenity, fighting words, false statements of
fact, commercial speech, and child pornography are all examples of classes of speech having low First
Amendment value); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358-59 (2003) (noting that the first amendment
permits restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas).
84 Dawn C. Nunziato, Freedom of Expression, Democratic Norms, and Internet Governance, 52
EMORY L.J. 187, 195 (2003).
85 See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 n. 19 (1969) (noting that the
government had a stronger interest in regulating speech on broadcast radio because of its limited
frequencies and invasive nature). See also Sable Commc'ns of Cal, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128
(1989) (holding that the government's interest in regulating speech through telephone communication
was less substantial because there is not a "captive audience" problem like there was in Red Lion, where
content could involuntarily reach listeners).

2011]

847

THE PRIVACYOFDEA THON THE NTERNET

Reno v. ACLU,86 the Supreme Court broadly affirmed the First
Amendment's application on the Internet, 87 striking down restraints on
speech imposed by the Communications Decency Act of 1996.88 Adjusting
to the nature of the Internet, the Court emphasized its dissimilarity from
other forms of media that were previously regulated. The Court noted that
the scarcity of bandwidth, which was a motivating factor in regulating
other media, was irrelevant with the Internet. 89 Equally important, the
Internet lacks the invasive element present in other forms of media. 9 0
Lastly, the Government did not impose regulations on the Internet. 9 1
Despite the First Amendment interest upheld in Reno, the Court did not
adopt a "bold affirmative rationale for keeping the Internet free from
content regulation." 92
a. The Communications Decency Act of 1996
In 1996, Congress, responding to the heavily criticized decision in
Stratton Oakmont Inc.

v.

Prodigy Services

Co.,93

enacted

the

Communications Decency Act (CDA) to limit liability for "interactive
computer service providers" (ISPs). 94 ISPs are defined as "any information
86 521 U.S. 844, 863 (1997) (holding that content of speech on the Internet is entitled to the highest
protection from Governmental restriction).
87 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 870; R. Johan Conrod, Linking Public Websites to the Public Forum, 87
VA. L. REv. 1007, 1021-22 (2001) (discussing the precedent set in Reno when the Court broadly
affirmed the First Amendment's application to the Internet).
88 Id. at 1021 (". . . the Reno Court first noted that the CDA constituted a 'content-based blanket
restriction on speech' and was not an acceptable time, place, and manner regulation. It then found that
the Act was unconstitutionally vague and could have a chilling effect on permissible speech" (quoting
Reno, 521 U.S. at 868)).
89 Compare Reno, 521 U.S. at 869 (noting that internet users rarely "encounter content 'by
accident"'), with Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388 (stating that "[w]here there are substantially more
individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an
unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak,
write, or publish.").
90 CompareReno, 521 U.S. at 870 (stating that Internet content does not involuntarily reach users
because users must take an affirmative step to encounter content), with Red Lion, 395 U.S. at (noting
the importance in allowing the government to have the power to regulate public radio).
91 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 868-69 (stating that the Internet had not been subject to the type of
government supervision and regulation as the broadcast industry).
92 Gary D. Allison, The Cyberwar of 1997: Timidity and Sophistry at the First Amendment Front,
33 TULSA L.J. 103, 114 (1997).
93 No. 310063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (holding a
computer network liable for third-party content because of its conduct in monitoring the content of its
bulletin board). See Jonathan Band & Matthew Schruers, Safe Harbors Against the Liability Hurricane:
the Communications Decency Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 20 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 295, 297 (2002) (relating the recognition from Congress that the holding in Straton Oakmont
is thought to be an anomalous result because an ISP could be penalized for its efforts to rid the Internet
of offensive content).
94 The Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). See Band & Schruers, supra note
93, at 297 (noting that despite provisions being struck down in Reno as unconstitutional, Section 230 of
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service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables
computer access by multiple users to a computer server." 95 In Stratton, the
court imposed liability upon an ISP that monitors its content, and
effectively subjected the ISP to the tough standards of publisher liability. 96
This result was antithetical to the objectives of the CDA, at that time under
consideration, which sought to encourage online service providers to
remove inappropriate content without fear of liability. 97 Specifically § 230
immunizes ISPs from liability for content published by third-persons, even
if the ISP monitors its service. 98 Since its inception, the CDA has been
construed to provide broad immunity from a variety of state law claims. 99
The underlying goal behind this legislation was to foster the social value of
ISPs by shielding them from liability that could threaten their continued
benefit.oo Because of the CDA, intermediaries that thrive from third-party
content such as Craigslist, America Online, YouTube, Amazon, and eBay
can now set their own content standards, monitor their services, and use
their own discretion without being treated like publishers.101 In essence, the
CDA subsidizes "new intermediary models by protecting them from

the CDA was left undisturbed.)
95 47 U.S.C. § 230(0.
96 Stratton, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *10- 11 (holding that the ISP was a publisher rather
than a distributor).
97 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that Section 230 was
meant to encourage self-regulation of the dissemination of offensive material); Band & Schruers, supra
note 93, at 297(indicating that the result was contrary to the objectives of the CDA).
98 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328 ("Section 230 ... immunizes computer service providers like AOL
from liability for information that originates with third parties."); Band & Schruers, supra note 93, at
297 ("Section 230, therefore, immunized ISPs from liability as content publishers even if they
monitored their service.").
99 See Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 501 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (holding that Google was
immune from tort liability under § 230 even where Google had archived, cached, or provided access to
content created by a third party); Band & Schruers, supra note 93, at 297 (observing that § 230 even
protects ISPs from liability on claims of "negligence, business disparagement, waste of public funds,
and infliction of emotional distress.").
100 See Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediariesand the First Amendment,
76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 986, 1008 (2008) (noting that "Congress believed that it needed to alter the
common law, even more than it had been modified by the First Amendment, to give Internet
intermediaries the chance to make their business models work."); Amy J. Tindell, "Indecent"
Deception: The Role of Communications Decency Act § 230 in Balancing Consumer and Marketer
Interests Online, 2009 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 71901, 15 (stating that the safe harbor provision
of § 230 encourages growth and development of the Internet and prevents ISPs from having to prohibit
access to certain material).
101 See, e.g., Chicago Lawyers' Comm. For Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519
F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008) (concluding that only by identifying Craigslist as a publisher, which is
prohibited under § 230, could Craigslist be liable for the actions of the speaker); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331
(reasoning that the purpose of § 230 "forbids the imposition of publisher liability on a service provider
for the exercise of its editorial and self-regulatory functions"); Hyland, supra note 77, at 83 (positing
that companies like Amazon and eBay, which offer user-integrated forums, would not be able to do so
if § 230 allowed for notice-based liability).
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otherwise applicable law, but only as a matter of legislative grace." 1 02 As a
consequence, users and subscribers are free, within the confines of the
ISP's content standards, to publish material that can often offend and injure
third-persons. 103 In the event that injurious content is published, under the
CDA the content does not have to be removed by the ISP, and the true
publisher is cloaked in anonymity.
B. The Newsworthiness ofDeath
The right to prevent public disclosure of private facts is always balanced
against the First Amendment right to publish newsworthy content. 104 As a
critical element in a private facts action, it is the plaintiffs burden to prove
the information lacks newsworthiness. 105 But the press cannot be
forestalled from publishing matters of legitimate public concern, so courts
are left to balance the societal interest in the matter against the privacy
interest at stake. 106 Since the CDA does not limit liability for "information
content provider[s]" or "any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or
in part, for the creation or development of information provided through
the Internet or any other interactive computer service," any death-related
content on the Internet falling within this category will be subject to a
newsworthy analysis under a privacy claim. 107
Newsworthiness does not only consist of news which "sells papers or
boosts ratings," lest our privacy would be swallowed by the First
Amendment. 10 8 Since the "line between informing and.. . entertaining is
too elusive," the publisher doesn't need to intend to educate the public.109
102 See Tushnet, supranote 100, at 1008-09.
103 See, e.g., Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332-33 (holding that AOL was not liable for failing to remove
libelous postings on a bulletin board); PatentWizard, Inc. v. Kinko's, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1071
(D.S.D. 2001) (noting that Kinko's could not be placed in a third-party's shoes and held responsible for
the defamatory statements published by the third-party).
104 See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489 (1975) ("Because the gravamen of the
claimed injury is the publication of information, whether true or not, the dissemination of which is
embarrassing or otherwise painful to an individual, it is here that claims of privacy most directly
confront the constitutional freedoms of speech and press"); Shulman v. Group W Prods. Inc., 955 P.2d
469, 478 (Cal. 1998) ("[A]n actionable invasion of privacy has generally been understood to require
balancing privacy interests against the press's right to report").
105 See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 478-79 (discussing the plaintiff's burden of proving the lack of
newsworthiness); Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 768-770 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)
(placing the burden on the plaintiff to show that the publication lacked newsworthiness).
106 See generally Cox Broad, 420 U.S. at 491 (upholding the publication of a 17-year-old rape
victim's name by the press). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 625D cmt. d, illus. 12
(1977) (discussing invasions of privacy in regard to matters of legitimate public concern).
107 See The Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
108 See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 481 (noting the descriptive theory of newsworthiness).
109 Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 483 P.2d 34, 38 n.6 (Cal. 1971).
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Also, newsworthiness cannot become a pure value judgment either or else
courts could become substitute editors of the news and arbiters of public
taste. 110 To better evaluate and determine newsworthiness, some courts
have considered: (1) the medium of publication; (2) the social value of the
facts published; (3) the extent of the use; (4) the public interest served by
the publication; (5) the seriousness of the interference with the person's
privacy and the depth of the article's intrusion into ostensibly private
affairs; and (6) the degree in which the person was voluntarily placed in a
position of public notoriety.111
More often than not, the decedent's family is precluded from pursuing a
private facts action under the traditional view that the claim does not
survive the decedent. 112 Although in Savala the court proceeded to find the
death-image newsworthy under the newsworthy analysis, other courts have
not dealt with this issue often enough to deem this the rule and not the
exception. It is difficult to fathom how a decapitated photo of an eighteenyear old can be protected as newsworthy and not precluded as publicity that
has "become[] a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its
own sake," with which a reasonable person would be offended and agree is
of no public concern. 113
C. Death Depicted on the Internet

The Internet is naturally structured to enable the dissemination of an
unprecedented amount of information, while serving an unlimited amount
of personal interests. 114 Given the historical intrigue with death in the
media, 115 it is not too surprising to conceive a web-market where users can
consume death-related content. After all, the media does print obituaries
110 See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 481 (noting the normative theory of newsworthiness); Galella v.
Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (explaining that no court has ever accepted publication
as conclusive evidence of newsworthiness).
Ill See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 481-82 ("[fjactors deserving consideration may include the medium
of publication, the extent of the use, the public interest served by the publication, and the seriousness of
the interference with the person's privacy" (quoting Gill v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 278-279
(1952))); Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 922(Cal. 1969) (citing Gill, 38 Cal.2d at 278-279).
112 See discussion supra Part I.A.
113 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (1977).
114 See, e.g., Ellen Luu, Note, Web-Assisted Suicide and the First Amendment, 36 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 307, 308 (2009) (noting the dangerous popularity of a website devoted to suicide as a
legitimate alternative to life). See also Terri Day, Bumfights and Copycat Crimes ... Connecting the
Dots: Negligent Publicationor ProtectedSpeech?, 37 STETSON L. REV. 825, 826 (2008) (describing the
danger behind a website devoted to the promotion of abusing bums. Often the producers would entice
the bums to fist fight one another for cash or would pay them to do other harmful acts).
115 See Calvert, supra note 16, at 142-43 (explaining how people find it interesting when other
people die).See also Michael Sappol, Why the DeadAre a Killer Act, L.A. TIMES, June 12, 2005, at M5
(discussing the modem trend of the media being obsessed with death).
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and to a certain extent presents death as news. 116 However, the content
being presented on the Internet does not have to adhere to the inherent
restraints imposed on other forms of media. Content on the Internet is not
involuntarily broadcast into our homes, 117 nor does it receive the type of
editorial scrutiny that traditional mediums were subject to before releasing
content that the marketplace would deem utterly inappropriate and
offensive."t 8
The content discussed in this section includes depictions that capture
images of a decedent's autopsy, corpse, cause of death, or manner by which
he or she died, body parts of the deceased, or any other depiction that
portrays the decedent's actual death. To illustrate, one website graphically
portrayed horrific images of twenty-year old Daniel Pollen being stabbed to
death in a street attack with a rap music soundtrack running behind the
footage.1 9 Websites such as Rotten.com, DeathnDementia.com,
Crimescenephotos.com, Findadeath.com, and Everwonder.com/david/
worldofdeath are all prime examples of "information content providers"
that flourish from depicting similar content.120 Surprisingly, all of these
websites are based in the United States.121 In addition, interactive blogs and
bulletin boards substantially contribute to the proliferation of this content
being posted by third-party users.
116 See Calvert, supra note 16, at 143 (stating that news media has been engaging in "sensational
and sometimes exploitive coverage of death"); Sappol, supra note 115, at M5 (noting that entertainment
media is capitalizing on a "larger cultural trend" in focusing on dead bodies).
117 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 854-55 (1997) (discussing that "[s]ystems have been
developed to help parents control" internet access in the home); ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 83050 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (stating 123 Findings of fact regarding the state and its understanding of the Internet,
which includes fact number 89 of 123 that asserts "the receipt of information on the Internet requires a
series of affirmative steps more deliberate and directed than merely turning a dial.")
118 Consider whether Nicole Catsouras' decapitated image would have received the same popular
response if it were published in the New York Times or shown on NBC daytime television news. See
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 48 n.7 (D.D.C. 1998) (stating that the Internet has no
gatekeepers, publishers or editors who control the distribution of information); see also Bruce W.
Sanford & Michael J. Lorenger, Teaching An Old Dog New Tricks: The FirstAmendment In An Online
World, 28 CoNN. L. REv. 1137, 1142-43 (1996) (stating that there are three ways in which the Internet
differs from other forms of mass communication).
119 See Lad's Murder Screened on Vile Websites, supra note 75 (noting the graphic portrayal with
the underlying "rap music soundtrack").
120 Rotten.com provides a summary about its website, stating that "Rotten Dot Com is the
Internet's preeminent publisher of disturbing, offensive, disgusting, yet extremely compelling content.
Founded in 1996 after the enactment of the Communications Decency Act, our mission is to actively
demonstrate that censorship of the Internet is impractical, unethical, and wrong." About at Rotten Dot
Com, An Archive of Disturbing Illustration, http://rotten.com/about/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2010)
(emphasis added).
121 According to Alexa.com, Rotten.com is in California; Crimescenephotos.com is in Texas;
is in Ohio; and
Findadeath.com is in California; Everwonder.com/david/worldofdeath
DeathnDementia.com is in Virginia. Alexa, The Web Information Company, www.alexa.com (search
"domain name"; then follow "Contact info" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 18, 2010), accord, Domain
Tools, http://whois.domaintools.com/ (search "domain name") (last visited Oct. 18, 2010).
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To further explain the nature of the content depicted on the preceding
websites and online bulletin boards, consider the following examples. On
Everwonder.com/david/worldofdeath, the website is categorized by types
of death, which includes: "squished man," "shotgun suicide," "hit by car,"
"hit by train," "burnt in fire," and "split head." 22 As one might imagine,
the content depicted under these categories is utterly horrific and contains
nothing more than brief descriptions and the images themselves. On
DeathnDementia.com, the website displays a plethora of death-images
under the section "death and disfigurement." 23 For example, the
"bloodshow" sub-section portrays several video clips of actual deaths
caught on tape, including one labeled "half for you and half for me" with
accompanying text describing the footage stating "here's a flick with some
woman who was in a horrible auto accident. The accident itself is bad
enough. Added to that, the lady is cut in half. Added to that, she's still
alive." 24
Although most of these websites contain some legitimate non-death
related content in addition to these gruesome images, it is evident that users
are searching for death-images when they access these sites. According to
Statsaholic.com, a website devoted to data collection, the top keywords
driving the traffic of DeathnDementia.com include "worse pictures of
killing," "sick stuff," and "gross death pictures."l 2 5 The top keywords
driving the traffic of Everwonder.com/david/worldofdeath include "death
videos" and "beheading videos." 26 Taking this into account, it is
reasonable to infer that users visiting these websites have done so with the
intent to view content related to the keywords used to find them. If a user
types "worse [sic] pictures of killings" in the Google search engine and
retrieves DeathnDementia.com,1 2 7 it is logical to assume he or she is
interested in the specific content found under the section "death and
disfigurement."
Online bulletin boards present a greater challenge to death-images
because these discussion forums are sporadically located throughout the
122 World of Death, http://everwonder.com/david/worldofdeath/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
123 Death and Dementia, http://www.deathndementia.com/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
124 Bloodshows, Blood Vault One, http://www.bloodshows.com/vaultl.html (last visited Oct. 18,
2010).
125 See Site Profile for DeathnDementia.com, http://siteanalytics.compete.com/deathnde
mentia.com/?metric-uv (last visited Oct. 18, 2010).
126 See Site Profile for: Everwonder.com, http://siteanalytics.compete.com/everwonder.com/
?metric=uv (last visited Apr. 16, 2009) (displaying a list in the "Search Analytics" section, of the five
most popular search keywords that bring user traffic to this particular site).
127 See Site Profile for: DeathnDementia.com, supra note 125 (noting that 49.63% of user traffic
was referred to DeathnDementia.com by Google.com).
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Internet. However, using search terms keyed to death related content in
any search engine will help filter through this problem. For example, using
Google's search engine keyed to "Porsche girl" will result in finding
thousands of bulletin boards that have Nicole Catsouras' gruesome images
displayed.128 These forums are modestly regulated, and the content is
posted at the discretion of third-party users. The sites themselves do not
take part in selecting or maintaining the content and merely provide a
means in which users can dictate content.
III. CRITICISMS OF THE CURRENT RIGHT TO PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET

There is significant doubt as to whether a decedent's relative can
effectively remove death-images of their deceased family member(s) from
the Internet. Website liability in this area is relatively new and ISPs are
disinclined to get involved because of the CDA. The Internet is certainly a
socially valuable resource of information and entertainment, but should
relatives be subject to torment out of respect for an unfettered World Wide
Web? To this end, how much privacy are we willing to compromise in
order to protect the Internet from censorship regarding images of the dead?
Section A discusses the relative's lack of recourse regarding Internet
publications of death-images. Specifically, Section Al explains how the
current liability regime under the CDA affects the relative's ability to seek
a remedy for user generated depictions of death. Section A2 highlights the
relative's difficult task in prevailing over the First Amendment right to
publish newsworthy content.
A. No Rightsfor the Decedent or Decedent's Relatives
Under the common law regarding the right to privacy,129 and the liability
regime under the CDA,130 decedents and their relatives are left with no
128 See Porsche Girl - Google Search, www.google.com (type "Porsche girl" into the "Search" bar
and press "Google Search"). Also, to illustrate the influence that Google and Yahoo have on locating
death-images, see Site Profile for: Nikkicatsouras.net, http://siteanalytics.compete.com/nikkicatsouras
.net/?metric=uv (last visited Apr. 16, 2009), which provides a profile of Nikkicatsouras.net,a website
devoted to pictures of Nicole Catsouras' corpse, and notes that 64.94% of users visiting
Nikkicatsouras.net were referred by searching Google.com and 35.06% were referred by searching
Yahoo.com.
129 See supra note 14 (listing the cases that have found that the privacy claim dies with the
decedent).
130 See The Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006) (outlining rules that make it
easy for ISPs to avoid liability when acting as a pathway to offensive content); suprap. 2, (explaining
that ISPs escape liability under the CDA and thus may refuse to remove offending user-created
content).
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recourse. This was likely the case for Nicole Catsouras' family in
attempting to remove the grisly photos of Nicole's corpse from the
Internet. 13 1 While the holding in Favish and state statutes limiting access to
autopsy photos will help prevent the unnecessary release of death-images,
there is no similar protection for decedent's relatives once those images are
leaked and posted on the web.13 2 Implicit in the right to prevent disclosure
of private facts is the right to "define one's circle of intimacy" and avoid
being "humiliat[ed] beneath the gaze of those whose curiosity treats a
human being as an object." 33 Anonymously viewing unnamed corpses at
the most gruesome angles, for the sake of nothing more than curiosity,
must not prevail over the privacy interest of a relative in keeping those
images private. As the Supreme Court in Favish noted, "We have little
difficulty ... in finding in our case law and traditions the right of family
members to direct and control the disposition of the body of the deceased
and to limit attempts to exploit pictures of the deceased family member's
remains for public purposes." 34 However, the Internet continues to provide
an unregulated platform for deviants to abuse the deceased and has allowed
the world to satisfy its insatiable curiosity for death packaged as
entertainment.1 35
a. Internet Service Providers are Immune Under the CDA
"Interactive computer services" or "Internet service providers" (ISPs) do
not have to remove death-images from websites where third-party users
post such content.136 Congress made a policy decision to immunize ISPs
due to the unreasonable restraint it would cause if they were required to
131 See Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U.L. REV. 61, 105 (2009) (stating that
Nicole's family could not track down the anonymous posters and the pictures remained online);
Hardesty, supra note 1 (noting Nicole's family's lack of success in removing the death-images from the
Internet, even after hiring a company called Reputation Defender to contact website operators and get
them to take down the offensive images).
132 See Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 170 (2004) (holding that family
members have a right to personal privacy with respect to their close relatives' death-scene images); see
also Brief of Anicus Curiae, supra note 16, at 24 (noting the number of states with laws that make
autopsy photographs and reports confidential).
133 Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 483 P.2d 34, 37 (Cal. 1971).
134 Favish, 541 U.S. at 167.
135 Dave Brown, the investigating officer in the Daniel Pollen murder that was posted on U.S.
websites, commented that while he thinks the current death-oriented websites are disgusting he's "not
too sure how we can stop these sites." See Lad's Murder Screened on Vile Websites, supra note 75.
Others have observed that "in the cyberworld anything goes." See Bennett, supra note 2.(.
136 See Band & Schruers, supra note 93, at 295 (noting that ISPs are provided blanket immunity
from any civil liability claim other than a claim for intellectual property infringement); Ali Grace
Zieglowsky, Note, ImmoralImmunity: Using a Totality of the CircumstancesApproach To Narrow the
Scope of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 61 HASTINGs L.J. 1307, 1309 (2010)
(suggesting that courts have interpreted the Act to create immunity from liability for ISPs).
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cipher through the massive amounts of user-generated content over the
Internet. 13 7 Section 230 satisfies two objectives: (1) to shield ISPs from
liability and foster free speech and (2) encourages ISPs to suppress
offensive speech without fear of offending the Constitution.138 By
modifying the common law and adapting to this new medium, Congress
has granted ISPs the power to determine what remains posted and what is
to be removed on the Internet irrespective of its legality.139 Due to the
difficulty in identifying the derivation of anonymously posted content,
many commentators have now started to support a decrease in immunity
for ISPs.140
As mere conduits, ISPs are not responsible for proactively policing their
content and will most likely not remove death-images upon request. Even
if removed, ISPs are not held to be on constructive notice to remove
subsequent postings of the same content by different users or repeat
postings by the original source of the content. 14 1 Although most of the
litigation dealing with Section 230 of the CDA has been under the pretext
of defamation,1 42 courts have been inclined to respect the underlying intent
of Congress to limit liability.143 Therefore under the present liability
137 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that "[ilt would be
impossible for service providers to screen each of their millions of postings for possible problems.");
Tushnet, supra note 100, at 1007-09 (stating that "[t]he CDA was enacted on the theory that no ISP
would accept the risk of . . . liability, given the massive amounts of user-generated content that the
Internet allows.").
138 See Donato v. Moldow, 865 A.2d 711, 726 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (asserting that
"[glranting immunity furthers the legislative purpose of encouraging self-regulation to eliminate access
to obscene or otherwise offensive materials while at the same time advancing the purpose of promoting
free speech on the Internet, without fear of liability."); Tushnet, supra note 100, at 1010 (stating the two
objectives of Section 230).
139 See The Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. §230(c)(l)-(2) (2006) (Service providers are
not liable for any good faith actions restricting access to content or actions taken to make content
available); Tushnet, supra note 100, at 1002 (noting that "[section] 230 of the CDA allows ISPs to set
their own content standards and still avoid being treated like publishers.").
140 See Tushnet, supra note 100, at 1011 (stating that "various commentators have proposed
cutting back on ISP immunity to encourage them to act against unlawful speech, especially when the
speaker is anonymous or difficult to identify."); Hyland, supra note 77, at 83 (noting that in one
case"[a] California court looked to the legislative history of section 230 and determined that it was
never intended to provide such sweeping immunity to web operators.")
141 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 (rejecting the plaintiffs contention that ISPs should be subject to
notice based liability); Hyland, supra note 77, at 82 (arguing that the results of the Zeran interpretation
of section 230 have been problematic).
142 See, e.g., Hyland, supra note 77, at 101 (discussing the section 230 cases following Zeran). See
also Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that most of the section
230 claims arise under a defamation theory).
143 See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49 (D.D.C. 1998) (explaining that it is the
intention of Congress to promote the development of the Internet and other interactive services and to
preserve the vibrant and competitive free market for such services, ); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018,
1034 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that "Congress's purpose in enacting § 230(c)(1) suggests that we must
take great care in determining whether another's information was 'provided' to a 'provider or user of an
interactive computer service' for publication. Otherwise, posting of information on the Internet and
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regime for ISPs, decedents' relatives will have no course of action in
preventing the private images of their deceased family members from
aggressively spreading over online forums where users generate content.
b. Websites Are Protected Under the First Amendment
Even though websites that constitute "information content providers" are
not immune from liability under the CDA,144 they have a strong likelihood
of avoiding accountability under the right to publish newsworthy content.
These publishers are comprised of websites that manage, select, and
exercise editorial control over the content displayed. Defined as "any
person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the Internet or any other
active computer service," these sites will be treated as publishers for
liability purposes. Prior courts have been deferential to the press in
publishing private facts that are related to matters of legitimate concern.1 45
Moreover, it is the relative's burden to prove the content depicting the
deceased is not newsworthy. 146 As a result, decedent's relatives have a
minimal possibility of prevailing in a private facts action.
The daunting fact remains that most state courts are unwilling to
recognize a common law privacy right in the decedent's relatives.1 47
However, if the court allows the claim to proceed, the newsworthiness of
the content is entirely fact sensitive and has often been weighted in favor of
the First Amendment.1 48 Even taking into account the horrific depictions
that some of these websites promote, courts have not required pictures to
have a particular news value, but have instead allowed for pictures that
serve the function of entertainment as a matter of legitimate public
interest.14 9 Furthermore, applying the sort of "logical relation test"
other interactive computer services would be chilled).
144 See Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 50 (noting that Drudge was "an 'information content provider'
since he wrote alleged defamatory material about the Blumenthals contained in the Drudge report").
145 See Savala v. Freedom Commc'ns Inc., 2006 WL 1738169, at *7 (Cal. App. 5 Dist. 2006)
(discussing the need to avoid unconstitutional interference with the free press); Shulman v. Group W
Prods. Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 485 (Cal. 1998) (explaining that there is a need for truthful reporting on
matters of legitimate public interest without unconstitutional interference).
146 See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 478 (stating that the lack of newsworthiness is part of a plaintiff's
case in a private facts action); Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 768 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983) (explaining that it is an error to state that the defendants have the burden of proving
newsworthiness).
147 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 26 (illustrating that right to privacy actions have traditionally
not been maintained after the death of a person whose privacy has been invaded).
148 See, e.g., Savala, 2006 WL 1738169 at *5 (discussing the importance of allowing newsworthy,
truthful material); Shulman, 955 P.2d at 479 (noting that the burden is on the plaintiff to establish lack
of newsworthiness as an element and that courts "must struggle" to balance competing interests).
149 See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 482 (noting that a photograph can enjoy "some measure of
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implemented by many state courts applying the newsworthy analysis, it is
difficult to conceive of a situation where publicity can't be given to private
facts. 5 0 In both Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc. and Savala, the
court stated "where the facts disclosed about a private person involuntarily
caught up in events of public interest bear a logical relationship to the
newsworthy subject of the broadcast and are not intrusive in great
disproportion to their relevance - the broadcast was of legitimate public
concern, barring liability under the private facts tort."1 51 In Savala, the
court found a logical relationship between the public's interest in the city's
murder rate and the photograph of the murdered decedent.1 52 Courts have
been clear in stating that the standard is not "necessity."l 5 3 That is, the fact
that the publication could have been edited to exclude the depictions of
private facts does not mean that the publisher must eliminate that
content. 154 Under these standards, it is possible that a court could find
Nicole Catsouras' accident photographs to have "some substantial
relevance" to the increasing death toll from speeding-related car crashes in
California, which is likely a matter of public concern.1 55
B. The Nature of the Internet is Distinctfrom OtherForms of Media
The Internet is distinct from other forms of media in which courts have
found newsworthy content to outweigh the individual's right to privacy.15 6
Moreover, as previously indicated, courts have adapted their First
Amendment analysis to the nature of the medium involved.1 57 This
constitutional protection); Gill v. Hearst Publ'g Co., 253 P.2d 441, 444 (Cal. 1954) (explaining that
pictures lacking news content still receive first amendment protection).
150 See discussion supra Parts IA, I.C (showing that the "logical relation test" does not solve the
present conflict in balancing the interests involved).
151 Shulman, 955 P.2d at 478 (emphasis added)
152 Savala, 2006 WL 1738169 at *7-8 (balancing the public's right to know and the freedom of the
press against plaintiff's privacy interest, and holding in favor of the public and the press).
153 Id. at *7(reasoning that the test is whether the photograph bears some substantial relevance to
the subject matter not whether the photograph is necessary to further the understanding of the subject
matter).
154 See Id. (noting the deference that the press will be given regarding editing of news pieces);
Shulman, 955 P.2d at 488 (explaining that even if a broadcast could have been edited while still
maintaining viewer interest, that fact is not determinative in the court's decision).
155 Even though the photographs are not necessary to enable the public to understand the
consequences of speeding car accidents, the language in Savala supports the editorial discretion of the
press, stating that the standard "is not necessity." Savala, 2006 WL 1738169 at *7.
156 See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 48 n.7 (D.D.C. 1998) (noting three "important"
ways that the "Internet is fundamentally different from traditional forms of mass communication). See
also Sanford & Lorenger, supra note 118, at 1139 (asserting that the Internet is different because it "is a
chaotic web of regional and national computer networks").
157 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) (holding that "differences in the
characteristics of new media justify differences in the FirstAmendment standards applied to them"); see
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evolution of First Amendment scrutiny has allowed the law to keep pace
with changing technology, which has always been a formidable adversary
of privacy. 158 As technology expands, the right to privacy contracts and
yesterday's privacy laws can no longer protect against tomorrow's
innovation. 159 Our ocular-centric culture is dominated by visual imagery
and "technology that makes it possible to capture and, in an instant,
universally disseminate a picture."l 60 But with this power comes
responsibility, and images of death should not be consumed by users
cloaked in anonymity whose voyeurism comes at the expense of grieving
relatives. For this reason, traditional notions of privacy protection dealing
with depictions of death need to be modified to accommodate the
challenges presented by the Internet.
The following disparities amongst the several forms of media may play a
crucial role in highlighting deficiencies that current privacy law affords
Internet publications. First, unlike print or television, Internet content
sustains unlimited duration once archived on a particular website, or copied
on to other websites and personal desktops.161 Decedent's relatives may be
exposed to a perpetual publication that is available indefinitely on the
web.1 62 Second, the speed and digital quality of communicating the image
allows the content to spread over an unlimited geographical area and to a
boundless audience. 163 Once posted, it becomes extremely difficult to
also Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952) (noting that motion pictures are not "necessarily
subject to the precise rules governing any other particular method of expression")
158 See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 473 (emphasizing the concern of Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren
over 100 years ago that the invention of "instantaneous photographs" was a threat to our privacy when
abused by the press). See also Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 503 (1952) (stating that each method of
expression presents "its own peculiar problems" to the court).
159 See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 473(remarking on the increase and progress of devices available for
recording and transmitting what would otherwise be private); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 195
(1890) (noting that "[i]nstantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred
precincts of private and domestic life").
160 Shulman, 955 P.2d at 473-74 (noting the detailed and graphic discussion of intimate personal
and family matters in modem public discourse).
161 Nicole Catsouras' death photographs are widely available over the Internet. Christopher
Goffard, Photos Spur Privacy Fight; A Car Crash Victim's FatherSues CHP Over Gruesome Pictures
Disseminated on the Internet, L.A. TIMES, May 15, 2010, at Al. This sort of display of death-images
would be unlikely in one-time-printed newspaper publications or on television. See id.
162 See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 483 P.2d 34, 40-41 (Cal. 1971) (discussing the
importance of time relation when determining if the private facts disclosed are still matters of public
concern); See also Calvert, supra note 16, at 150 (discussing injuries to privacy and emotional
tranquility that next of kin experience as a result of the publication of images of their dead family
members).
163 See Bradley C. Nahrstadt & Jeremy T. Burton, Must You Watch What You Say? Application of
CDA to Publications on the Internet, 12 No. 9 J. INTERNET L. 1, 1 (2009) (describing the "worldwide
reach" of the Internet). See also World Internet Usage Statistics News and World Population Stats,
Internet Usage Statistics, http//www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2010)
(finding that there are currently close to 2 billion internet users worldwide).
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remedy.
Contrast this with newspaper retractions after one-time
publications.
Third, anonymous posting and anonymous viewing
encourages a culture of communicating content without concern for thirdparty accountability. 164 Anonymity is the "salvation" for users
disseminating death-images on Internet bulletin boards, and ISPs are
indifferent to the content's continued existence. 16 5 Unlike other forms of
media, user-generated content posted anonymously does not endure the
ominous editorial concern of offending the public. 166 This lack of editorial
oversight may contribute to the publication of valuable speech deemed
unpopular for mainstream forms of media, 167 but it also represents the
unconstrained ease with which exploitative death photos can be distributed
to a world audience.1 68 User generated content is posted at the discretion of
unaccountable anonymous third-parties. Fourth, the ability to modify,
manipulate and copy digital images displayed over the Internet enables
sensitive content to be republished outside its news providing origin and to
be recast in an extremely offensive manner. 169 Without digital management
protection from copying images of death, decedents are exposed to
unlimited exploitation by those with morbid intentions. 170 This factor
164 See Nahrstadt & Burton , supranote 164, at 1(noting that "the only limit on the postings made
by individual users is their own decency and self-restraint"); Garner Weng, Type No Evil:The Proper
Latitude ofPublic EducationalInstitutions in Restricting Expressions of Their Students on the Internet,
20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 751, 753 (1998) (explaining the potential to use the Internet to
transmit offensive and undesired expression).
165 See Barret,supra note 3 (stating that the current framework "emboldens the mean-spirited).
166 See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 48 n.7 (D.D.C. 1998) (noting how legal rules have
only begun to address privacy issues related to the lack of editorial control over the spread of
information over the internet). See also The Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1)
(2006) (acknowledging that the developing Internet represented an extraordinary advance in the
availability of informational resources).
167 See Tushnet, supranote 100, at 986 (demonstrating that without constraints on publication, the
Internet can provide citizens with greater access to differing viewpoints and nonmainstream subject
matter); see also Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press -- A New FirstAmendment Right, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1641, 1653 (arguing that an important factor in the right to free speech is securing a platform for
expression that enables one to reach the minds of the "hearers.").
168 ISPs are not filtering out material or exercising traditional editorial functions like deciding what
to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 ( 4 t Cir.
1997). This probably because courts have continually effectuated Congress's policy choice not to deter
potentially harmful online speech. See Universal Commc'n. Sys. v. Lycos Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419 (1"
Cir. 2007).
169 See Lads Murder Screened on Vile Websites, supra note 75 (referencing images of a horrific
street murder that was disseminated across the Internet through a website behind a rap music
soundtrack). See also Katharine T. Kleindiest et al., Computer Crimes, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 315,329
(2009) (stating that erotic photographs of adults may be doctored to resemble children).
170 See, e.g., Lad's Murder Screenedon Vile Websites, supra note 75. Anything can be copied and
re-displayed over the Internet. The Pollen case illustrates how these images can be recast, as users
posted footage of a young man being stabbed to death behind a rap music soundtrack. The video itself
was offensive enough, yet taken outside a news context it can be modified in such an obscene manner
as to be deemed unconscionable. Id. See also Calvert, supra note 16, at 145. Media coverage of death
and the dying has also been criticized as being overly graphic, and as "macabre voyeurism-
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should be heavily considered when allowing specific content to be
published as newsworthy, given the potential abuse that the Internet
enables.171 This result creates desensitized end users, viewing content
detached from a context and devoid of social significance.
The Internet is clearly unique from other forms of media under the
context of sensitive death-images. The Court in Reno v. ACLU was
reluctant to censor offensive content because the nature of the Internet was
less intrusive than other forms of media. 172 While this might have been
significant in a pure First Amendment analysis, under the privacy context
the nature of the Internet seems to favor greater privacy protection and
consequently less deference for the First Amendment.
V. NEW PROPOSAL
The exploitation of death-images over the Internet demands a modified
privacy law that is both applicable to the nature of this new medium and
provides an appropriate balance to better weigh the interests involved. The
traditional perspective of privacy under the common law is simply unsuited
for this technology. Furthermore, under the CDA injured relatives are left
with no reasonable protection from unwarranted invasions of privacy by
third-party users posting images of their loved one's death.' 7 3 Using the
decision in Favish and other cases upholding privacy against public
exploitation, 74 and the policies underlying state statutes enacted to protect
autopsy photos,175 this section will establish a greater privacy right for
decedent's relatives. To combat user generated death-images, Section A
proposes an amendment to the CDA that imposes liability upon ISPs who
fail to remove death-images. To better regulate information content
masquerading-as-news." Id..
171 See Lad's Murder Screened on Vile Websites, supra note 75 (giving examples of potential
abuse, including Pollen's death being shown on one site with a rap music soundtrack, and another site
showing the death footage with a bizarre, gloating commentary).
172 Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (noting that statutory language
amounted to censorship of some constitutionally acceptable speech and that such a burden on "adult
speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the
legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve.").
173 See Tushnet, supra note 100, at 1011 (emphasizing the difficulty of removing user generated
content and noting that various commentators have proposed cutting back on ISP immunity to
encourage them to act against unlawful speech, especially when the speaker is anonymous or difficult to
identify). See also Mills, supra note 71, at 9A (explaining how a coroner refused to allow a set of
parents to view their eighteen year-old daughter's remains after she crashed into a toll booth at 100
miles per hour because the carnage was too gruesome, and yet, photos of the crash-scene began
circulating on the Intemet).
174 See discussion supraPart I.B.
175 Id
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providers or those that create, manage and publish their content, Section B
proposes a two-part test that effectively allocates the burden of proof in a
private facts action.
A. Amending the CDA

To adequately provide decedent's relatives protection from the
dissemination of this sort of content, there must be an amended exception
to the CDA. Without altering the CDA, our deceased relatives remain
subject to abuse by anonymous third-parties who are only bound by their
own standards of decency.176 For this reason, Section 230(c)(1) should
read: "Except as provided in the amended section, no provider or user of an

interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of
any information provided by another information content provider." 7 7 The
amended section shall impose liability on ISPs for public disclosure of
private death-images if certain preconditions are not satisfied.178 That is, to
be eligible for immunity the ISP must: (1) lack actual knowledge or
awareness of facts or circumstances from which the public disclosure of
private death-images is apparent; (2) respond expeditiously to remove or
disable allegedly private death-images upon sufficient notice from a
verified relative of the deceased depicted; (3) maintain a procedure for
allowing counter-notice that such content was wrongfully removed;1 79 and
(4) establish a policy for terminating third-party users who repeatedly post
previously removed images.80
176 See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 48 n.7 (D.D.C. 1998). "Internet speakers are not
Id. See also Sanford & Lorenger, supra
restricted by the ordinary trappings of polite conversation ...
note 118, at 1137-1144 (1996). "[E]very person who taps into the Internet is his own journalist." Id. at
1142.
177 47 U.S.C § 230(c)(1) (2010) (italicized language added).
178 Similar to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which provides a safe harbor under
§ 512(c)(1) from copyright infringement liability. See 17 U.S.C. §512(c)(1) (2010).
179 These preconditions mirror the protection afforded to copyright owners under the DMCA,
which was enacted despite First Amendment concerns over censoring "fair use" when content is
removed upon request. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2010); Branwen Buckley, SueTube: Web 2.0 and
Copyright Infringement, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 235, 235 (2008). Because it would be impossible for
an ISP to manually review all posted videos and determine which material was not authorized, which
material is actually infringing, and which material is not protected by fair use, the copyright owner is in
the better position to determine which videos are infringing. See Id. Amending the CDA requires
similar considerations over censoring the First Amendment right to publish death-images; however,
given the low value of the speech and the privacy interest at stake, relatives should be afforded
deference in identifying publications of private matters for ISPs to remove.
180 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1) (2010). "The limitations on liability established by this section shall
apply to a service provider only if the service provider . . . has adopted and reasonably implemented,
and informs subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or network of, a policy for
the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service
provider's system or network who are repeat infringers . . . ." Id. See also Ellison v. Robertson, 357
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If an ISP fails to remove private death-image content upon request, or
has knowledge or awareness of facts and circumstances that such content
exists, the ISP should be held responsible for the resulting harm to
decedent's relatives. First, the private death-images defined in this section
shall include depictions that capture images of a decedent's autopsy,
corpse, cause of death, or manner by which he or she died, body parts of
the deceased, or any other depiction that portrays the decedent's actual
death. Second, those who are eligible to request the removal of such
content shall include: the decedent's spouse; descendants of the decedent;
the decedent's parents; descendants of the parents; and the decedent's
grandparents. 8 1 Upon requesting removal of this content, the preceding
family members must show: (1) proof of relationship and (2) that the
decedent is the individual being depicted. All evidence submitted by
decedent's relatives shall be presumed valid, and any challenge to its
validity must be asserted after removal, under the procedure for counternotification.182 The objective of this amendment is to treat ISPs as
distributors of private death-images for liability purposes if the
preconditions for immunity are unsatisfied.183
Similar to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (hereinafter DMCA),184
actual knowledge must go beyond a "general awareness" that such images
exist given the enormous amount of user generated content on many of
these sites.185 Alternatively, a relative can show awareness of facts and
F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004). "Upon receipt of Ellison's complaint, AOL blocked its subscribers'
access to the newsgroups at issue." Id.
181 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 406.135(2) (2010) (establishing a right for family members to keep
autopsy photographs confidential. In particular, the spouse, parents and adult children of the deceased);
see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE, § 2-106 (1997) (listing the family members that share in intestacy).
182 Similar to the mechanism provided under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. §
512(g) (limiting liability once material is removed or disabled in good faith, regardless of whether the
material is ultimately found to be a violation).
183 See Hyland, supra note 77, at 97 (explaining that distributor liability would place the ISP in a
position where it is only liable if it knows that such content exists or ignores a request for removal);
Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (declining to extend liability
to an ISP as a distributor, but acknowledging it may have attached if the ISP had reason to know of the
alleged defamatory material).
184 The DMCA was enacted shortly after the CDA and mirrored the CDA's objective to limit ISP
liability but applied only to intellectual property infringement. In contrast to the CDA, the DMCA does
not provide blanket immunity to ISPs from infringement liability, and instead creates a safe harbor
where ISPs are absolved from accountability if they satisfy certain requirements. See generally Band &
Schruers, supra note 93, at 304-05 (explaining the DMCA, the "safe harbor" it provides, and how the
courts have interpreted it); Charles S. Wright, Actual Versus Legal Control: Reading VicariousLiability
for Copyright Infringement Into the DigitalMillennium CopyrightAct of 1998, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1005,
1007 (2000) (commenting on the DMCA regulation).
185 See Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp.2d 1090, 1104 (W.D. Wash. 2004)
(clarifying, under the DMCA, that the issue wasn't whether Amazon had a general awareness of
infringement, but whether it actually knew specific instances of infringement were occurring. Absent
such evidence, actual knowledge could not be proved).
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circumstances from which a violation of privacy is apparent where the ISP
deliberately proceeded in the face of blatant indications that private images
were being disclosed. Analogous to the reasoning set forth in Corbis v.
Amazon when applying the DMCA,186 evidence that the online location at
which the death-images were available was clearly a "death site" should be
sufficient to prove apparent knowledge.1 87 That is, if a "brief and casual
viewing" of the site results in obvious disclosures of private images of
death, the ISP should be deemed aware of such content for liability
purposes. For example, Liveleak.com, like many ISPs, uses a search
engine to help navigate through its content. 188 If this search function yields
several results from terms keyed to death related content, the ISP should
have an apparent knowledge that this content exists. 189
In order for ISPs to provide sufficient protection under this amendment,
there must be an effective notice-and-takedown procedure for relatives to
invoke. Although this procedure may be challenged as having a chilling
effect on speech, the countervailing privacy interest at stake demands
appropriate deference.1 90 Moreover, the death-images depicted on the
Internet are "of such slight social value" that they are "deserving of only
limited constitutional protection."'91 To mitigate First Amendment
concerns, the third-party recipient of a notice of take down can
"countemotify" and "have the right to have the ISP return the challenged
material unless the sender files suit within a short period." 92 As in the
186 See id. (noting that even with proper enforcement procedures, if specific instances in which the
service provider tolerated the content at issue were presented there could still be a statutory violation).
187 See id at 1109.The Corbis Court used the term "pirate site" to indicate a website devoted to
content that is clearly infringing copyrights, but the same reasoning is sound when applied to "death
sites" and private content. See Id.
188 See www.liveleak.com. LiveLeak is an ISP, similar to YouTube.com in providing a means for
users to upload content. Id See also Interview with Hayden Hewitt, co-founder of LiveLeak.com.
http://www.thenewfreedom.net/wp/2008/05/19/interview-with-hayden-hewitt-co-founder-ofliveleakcom (May 19, 2008). LiveLeak started out as a "straight shock and gore site." Id.
189 See, e.g., A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001)
(highlighting Napster's failure to use its search indices to locate infringing content on its website as a
reason for imposing "vicarious liability" against Napster); 10 Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586
F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (noting that unlike Napster, Veoh seemingly policed its
system to the fullest extent).
190 See Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 166 (2004) (finding it proper to
conclude that an interest in "personal privacy" as framed by Congress intended to permit family
members to assert their our privacy rights against public intrusions); Catsouras v. Dep't of Cal.
Highway Patrol, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352, 364-65 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (explaining the rationale for
finding death images of a decedent to be worthy of privacy rights protection).
191 See Constitutional Law, supra note 80, at 1243 (stating that content-based restrictions have
been allowed where the benefit derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality).
192 See Tushnet, supra note 100, at 1014 (noting the chilling effect that threatened laws suits may
have on speech and how first amendment rights must be balanced with the desire to remove illconsidered defamatory speech).
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DMCA, the exception under the CDA can require that removal be made in
"good faith."193 This would force ISPs to have sufficient information prior
to removal to form a "good faith belief' that the material gave publicity to
private images depicting the decedent's death. 194 In addition, anyone that
makes a knowing material misrepresentation to an ISP that results in the
removal of content shall be subject to liability.195 With these protection
mechanisms in place, decedent's relatives will be afforded protection with
substance without offending the First Amendment rights of third-party
users.
B. New Testfor Striking the AppropriateBalance in the PrivacyAnalysis
With the above amendment in place, ISPs would be able to effectively
mitigate this "disgusting trade in human misery,"l 9 6 but information
content providers could still escape liability in a private facts action if the
death-images are found newsworthy and protected under the First
Amendment.197 This section offers a two-part test for courts to employ
when determining the newsworthiness of death related content created and
published by information content providers on the Internet. The test itself
is a hybrid and incorporates: (1) the factors enumerated in section II.B that
courts have considered when identifying newsworthiness;1 9 8 (2) the lowvalue nature of death-images as speech deserving less protection under the
First Amendment;199 (3) the tradition of adjusting the application of the
193 See, e.g., Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., 391 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 2004) (outlining
DMCA notice and takedown provisions including that the complaining party have "a goodfaith belief
that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent,
or the law").
194 Id. at 1004 (noting that the "good faith belief' requirement of the DMCA is subjective).
195 See e.g., Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F.Supp.2d 1195, 1204 (N.D. Cal. 2004)
(interpreting the statutory language regarding misrepresentation from the DMCA as clear on its face);
Charles W. Hazelwood, Jr., Fair Use and the Takedown/Put Back Provisionsof the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 50 IDEA 307, 319 (2010) (listing damages, costs and attorney fees as available remedies
in the case of a knowing material misrepresentation with regard to someone making a copyright
infringement claim).
196 See Jeffrey C. Billman, The Most Depraved Site on the Internet, ORLANDO WEEKLY, Oct. 6,
2005, availableat http://www.orlandoweekly.com/features/story.asp?id=8363 (characterizing images of
death posted on the controversial website www.nowthatsfuckedup.com).
197 See discussion supra Part III.A.2 (explaining that information content providers have the right
to publish newsworthy content).
198 See Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 481 (Cal. 1998) (discussing the factors the
Supreme Court of California used to evaluate newsworthiness); Clay Calvert, Revisiting the Voyeurism
Value in the First Amendment: From the Sexually Sordid to the Details of Death, 27 SEATTLE U. L.
REv. 721, 746-47(2004) (identifying the three factors often used to determine newsworthiness in
California).
199 See R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992) (explaining how society
has permitted restrictions on certain types of speech which "are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
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First Amendment to adapt to new forms of media; 200 and (4) the privacy
protection afforded in Favish and state statutes protecting autopsy
photos. 20 1 Using these supporting factors, the test establishes a method for
shifting the burden of persuasion in a newsworthy analysis. 202
The common law cannot continue to deny relief for relatives who wish
to preserve the memory of their deceased family members. 203 Few matters
in our culture are more private than photographs of our kin in their most
vulnerable state. 204 Since the deceased can no longer object to such
invasions of privacy, courts must allow relatives to contest the disclosure of
death-images. If courts fail to recognize the privacy claims of relatives,
technology and the Internet will override the privacy of death and all such
content becomes de facto newsworthy. 205
The test requires a two-step inquiry into the nature of the website and the
context in which the content is presented. The underlying goal is to create
a spectrum of protection that affords greater First Amendment rights to
newsworthy content and provides less deference to sites that appeal to
morbid curiosities. Although entertainment equally serves the public's

and morality" (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942))); ConstitutionalLaw,
supra note 80, at 1243 (noting that Supreme Court analysis often contains the language from
Chaplinsky).
200 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386, 389-90 (1969) (stating that broadcasting
is clearly a medium affected by a First Amendment interest and explaining how differences in the
characteristics of "new media" justify applying different First Amendment standards); See United States
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948) (noting that moving pictures should be treated
like newspapers and radio as press whose freedom is protected by the First Amendment).
201 See Nat'l Archives and Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 163-68 (2004) (finding that
the common law has granted family members the right to limit attempts by others to exploit pictures of
a deceased relatives); discussion supra Part I.B.
202 See, e.g., Charles M. Yablon, A Theory of Presumptions, 2 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 227,
227-28 (2003) (explaining the significance of burden-shifting in civil litigation); discussion infra Part
IV.B (proposing that the online website shall have the burden of proof where the court finds that the
website has displayed a post-mortem image alone without an informative or education context;
however, in the event that the court finds that the post-mortem image is accompanied by a legitimate
news story on the website, the decedent's family shall carry the burden of proof).
203 See cases cited supra note 14 (denying decedent's relatives privacy protection). But see Reid v.
Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333, 342 (Wash. 1998) (explaining how the immediate relatives of a decedent
have a protectable privacy interest in the autopsy records of decedent); McCambridge v. City of Little
Rock, 766 S.W.2d 909, 915 (Ark. 1989) (noting the privacy interest of the murder victim's mother in
nondisclosure of the crime scene photos certainly existed, though ruling that under the facts of the case
it was outweighed by the government's interests in depicting how the murders occurred and why the
police consider the case closed); Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 155 S.E. 194, 197 (Ga. 1930)
(recognizing the parent's right of privacy in photos of their deceased child's body).
204 See Favish, 541 U.S. at 168-69 (finding that the family has a privacy right over the body and
death images of the deceased). See generally Bazemore, 155 S.E. at 195 (Ga. 1930) (holding that the
publication of photos of the parents' dead child was a trespass upon the parents' right of privacy).
205 If relatives are precluded as a threshold matter from initiating a private facts action, courts
would never have to go into a newsworthy analysis to determine the legitimacy of the publication of
allegedly private death-images.
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interest, 206 invading the privacy of death demands a stronger justification
for disclosure. 207 "The wide viewing of such personal and painful
photographs ... will cause serious pain, anxiety, worry, and discomfort to
the family members." 208 The Internet is aggressively attacking the privacy
of decedent's relatives by enabling anonymous users to create a specialty
market of gruesome, grisly, and highly disturbing death-images. 209 The fact
that users are curious enough to view this content and perpetuate a demand
for this market does not alone mean it is of legitimate public interest. 2 10
The Court in Favish, noting the concern over post-mortem images
spreading to the Internet, established a privacy right that takes into account
the dangers of modern technology. 2 11
The first inquiry courts need to make is whether the website's content
serves the primary objective of displaying depictions of death with news
reporting serving a secondary role. 2 12 To clarify, courts should consider the
percentage of content that is devoted to depicting images of death and the
keywords driving traffic may be considered to extract the website's actual
function. 2 13 The second inquiry is whether the manner in which the image
is presented exploits the decedent. In order to draw out the exploitative
manner of publication, courts should ask: (i) do the death depictions
accompany a comprehensive story or explanation that factually highlights
the purpose of the image; 2 14 and (ii) will excluding the image deprive the
206 See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (stating that "[w]hat is one man's
amusement, teaches another's doctrine."); Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146, 157 (1946) (noting that
"[u]nder our system of government there is an accommodation for the widest varieties of tastes and
ideas. What is good literature, what has educational value, what is refined public information, what is
good art, varies with individuals as it does from one generation to another.").
207 See Favish, 541 U.S. at 172-73 (demanding a stronger justification for releasing suicide images
of the deceased); N.Y. Times Co. v. Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 782 F.Supp. 628, 630-31
(D.D.C. 1991) (requiring that when a substantial privacy interest is at stake, the privacy interest must be
weighed against the public interest in the release of the information).
208 Earnhardt v. Volusia County, 2001 WL 992068, at *3 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2001).
209 See discussion supra Part II.C (discussing the specialty market of death-image websites on the
Internet).
210 Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating that limitations exist as to
what constitutes a legitimate public interest); Shulman v. Group W Prods. Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 484 (Cal.
1998) (noting that evaluation of newsworthiness requires careful consideration for any particular
situation, and when identification of a particular person adds nothing to a story it can amount to an
unnecessary invasion of privacy).
211 Favish, 541 U.S. 157 at 167 (stating that family members of a decedent have their own privacy
rights protecting against public intrusions from an actor proliferating death-images of their loved one).
212 See discussion supra Part II.C (describing websites that are comprised of death-images, and
how they fundamentally fail convey any message outside the death images themselves).
213 See id. (discussing the methodology used by Statsaholic.com to determine what keywords lead
to the death-image websites).
214 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (explaining there are some classes
of speech that can be prevented or punished without raising any Constitutional problem); See
ConstitutionalLaw, supra note 80, at 1245 (asserting that courts should not apply reasoning that is too
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public of the article's informative value or substantially impair the
website's intended message as it is presented on the whole? 215 Generally, if
the answers to (i) and (ii) are negative, then the website's presentation of
the image is exploitative. However, if the answer to (i) is negative and the
answer to (ii) is affirmative, greater weight should be given to the former
question which establishes that the images are being published solely for
presenting death itself. If this is the case, the public's interest in the
decedent's death-image and the website's intended message would have to
substantially outweigh the privacy interest at stake.
To illustrate the purpose of the two-part test, consider the following
scenarios. Where a website is comprised predominantly of depictions of
gruesome images of death for the sake of promoting death, publicity of
such content should be presumed a "morbid and sensational prying into
private lives for its own sake, with which a reasonable member of the
public, with decent standards, would say that he had no concern." 2 16
Moreover, if the decedent's post-mortem image is displayed alone without
an informative or educational context, and if the website's informative
message can survive without violating the privacy of the decedent, the
court shall presume the decedent's relatives' privacy interest outweighs the
website's interest in disclosure. As a result, the website shall carry the
burden of proof in establishing the image's newsworthiness. This outcome
is meant to afford less deference to non-newsgathering websites that simply
appeal to morbid curiosities.
However, if the answer to the first question is in the negative, than the
answer to the second question is most often in the negative as well. That is,
the content accompanies a legitimate news story on a website primarily
committed to publishing non-death related content, and removing the
image will substantially impair the website's publication of public concern.
Here, the court shall presume that the image is necessary to convey the
matter of public concern, and the decedent's family shall carry the burden
of proof in establishing the images lack of newsworthiness. This result is
meant to afford greater deference to websites that genuinely distribute news
and matters of public interest.
Shifting the burden serves an important purpose as a preliminary step in
category-specific in ruling on First Amendment cases and instead should engage in content-based
restrictions on occasion, depending on the situation).
215 If the death-image is published alone, courts should demand that the image communicate more
than just the depiction of death itself. The publisher would have to assert a strong justification for
disclosure to outweigh the privacy right at stake.
216 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (1977).
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addressing the newsworthiness of death-images. 2 17 Taking into
consideration the exploitative potential of the Internet, these presumptions
are intended to sufficiently allocate the burden of proof. Courts need to
filter out the websites that abuse the deceased in the name of the First
Amendment from the websites that use the deceased to publish matters of
public interest. Once the burden is assigned, the party with the arduous
task of overcoming the presumption must show: (1) that the death-images
being published contain or do not contain social value; (2) that the public's
interest is or is not being served by the publication; and (3) that the
publication does or does not unnecessarily invade the privacy of the
decedent's relatives, and is or is not proportionate to the essential goal of
publishing a matter of legitimate public concern. 2 18
C. Application of the Two-Part Test and the Amendment to the CDA
The following examples illustrate the result that this two-step inquiry
will yield. Whether the parties can meet their burden of proof is uncertain
and will have to been done on a case-by-case basis. The following
hypothetical cases will demonstrate how the test will be applied to three
different sources of content on the Internet. Section 1 details a hypothetical
involving an "information content provider" that is not immune under the
CDA and will therefore be subject to a newsworthy analysis. 2 19 Similarly,
Section 2 uses a different "information content provider" but under like
circumstances, and demonstrates how the test can yield a different result
that adjusts to the nature of the website involved. Finally, Section 3
presents a hypothetical involving an online bulletin board where users
generate the content and ISPs are subject to the amended CDA proposed
above.
a. NYTimes.com
The New York Times website publishes a news article about the murder
rate in New York, which contains a picture of a crime-scene with an image
of the decedent's corpse displayed within the article. The decedent's
217 See Yablon, supra note 203, at 232 (commenting that the "correct allocation of the burden of
persuasion is viewed as an important part of the substantive law."); Majorie A. Silver, In Lieu of
Preclusion:Reconciling Administrative Decisionmaking and Federal Civil Rights Claims, 65 IND. L.J.
367, 433-434 n.348 (1990) (noting the importance of the burden of proof in our legal system).
218 See discussion supra Part H.B (extracting the elements from factors that courts have considered
in identifying the newsworthiness of content).
219 The Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006) (noting that information content
providers are not within the scope of protection provided under the CDA).
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relative has sought the removal of the image. The New York Times
website serves a primary function of distributing news, and images
depicting death are derivative to the website's newsgathering function. The
image is accompanied by an article of public concern, that is, the murder
rate in New York. Although the article might not lose its informative value
if the image is removed, this factor is only one in a sliding scale of
deferential treatment toward the website, and therefore should not be
dispositive in proving its validity. Thus, there should be a presumption that
the image concerns a legitimate matter of public interest deserving of
publication and the relatives shall carry the burden of proof.
b. Everwonder.com/david/worldofdeath
This website publishes a photograph of the decedent's corpse under a
section on the website entitled "stabbed to death." The decedent's relative
has sought the removal of the photo from the website. The website is
comprised exclusively of images capturing the deaths of individuals,
autopsy photos, and gruesome accidents often celebrating the horrific
manner in which the deceased has died. The website serves to shock the
conscience with grisly images, while news gathering and reporting of
legitimate matters of public concern serve a secondary role. The image
only accompanies a description of how the decedent was murdered, with
little informative value aside from the actual picture itself. Thus, there
should be a presumption that the public does not have a legitimate interest
in the image because it represents a morbid and sensational prying into
private lives for its own sake, with which a reasonable member of the
public, with decent standards, would say that he had no concern. 220 Upon
seeking removal of the picture, the husband, for example, would show
proof of relationship and that the female depicted was his wife. 22 1 If, for
example, the EMT from the scene wishes to contest the removal, he or she
can counter-notify the ISP and be exposed to litigation if the relative elects
to pursue a cause of action for invasion of privacy. Ultimately this affords
the decedent's relatives some measure of accountability for those that
communicate this sensitive content over the Internet. Although thirdparties do have a First Amendment freedom to speak, the low value of
death-images should not warrant the full protection of the Constitution. 222
220

The RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS,

§ 652D

cmt. h (1977).

221 Note that under the amended CDA, the ISP shall presume that the relative's proof is valid.
222 See ConstitutionalLaw, supra note 80, at 1239 (noting that child pornography does not receive
the general First Amendment test); United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 226 (3d Cir. 2008) (En
Banc) (explaining that the rational for the special treatment of child pornography would not be extended
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Moreover, the privacy interest in precluding this content from plaguing the
Internet demands more effective protection. 223 The significance and impact
on the relative's right to privacy if the image remains on the Internet until
deemed not newsworthy demands a presumption in favor of the decedent's
family to have the content timely removed as a matter of caution. 224 If the
third-party wishes to contest the removal and demand the republication of
the image, the burden should fall on the publisher of death-images to
defend their public importance.
CONCLUSION

There are few matters more private than the death of a family member
and the memories that resonate when one is gone. This is exactly what the
Supreme Court and state legislatures sought to preserve when they
bolstered the right to privacy and prevented the unwarranted exploitation of
death-images. 225 Unfortunately though, our privacy laws are still
insufficient to meet the unique challenges posed by the Internet, and the
progress made so far has only provided pre-disclosure remedies. 2 26
Adopting the proposals in Section IV would provide a progressive solution
to a problem that demands closer attention. Amending the CDA would not
substantially diminish Congress's overall plan to maintain the benefits of
intermediaries and would simply create a very narrow exception that
protects our privacy interest in death at least to the same degree that the
DMCA protects a copyright holder's interest in their works of
authorship. 227 Without this amendment relatives are left to rely on the
decency of anonymous users who are restrained only by their own
discretion. 228 Websites, on the other hand, require a different standard that
to other conduct).
223 See, e.g., discussion supra Part III.B (noting the difficulty of removing digital content that
spreads across the Internet very quickly).
224 Id.

225 See discussion supra Part I.B (stating that the trend is toward affording greater privacy
protection). See also Nat'l Archives and Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 173 (2004) (noting
the lower court's recognition of a family privacy interest with approval of such a rationale).
226 State statutes limit access to autopsy photographs. (emphasis added) See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §
406.135(1) (2010). The Court in Favish prevented disclosure in a FOIA action. (emphasis added)
Favish, 541 U.S. at 173.
227 See comparison of the DMCA to the CDA supranote 180.
228 See Barret, supra note 3 (noting the callous behavior of anonymous users posting remarks
about Nicole Catsouras and her tragic death); Jim Avila, et al., A Family'sNightmare: Accident Photos
of TheirBeautiful Daughter Released, ABCNEWS, Nov. 16, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/
story?id=3872556&page=l (mentioning the numerous anonymous e-mails and text messages received
by the family containing graphic photographs of the accident and images of Nichole Catsouras
decapitated body).
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better addresses the nature of the Internet and the interests involved. The
test is meant to dissect the website's use of private death-images and
effectively draw out what content is being presented as news and what
content is "macabre voyeurism-masquerading-as-news." 229 Depicting death
for death's sake equates to speech that is of such slight social value that it
cannot be afforded the complete protection of the First Amendment. 230
Moreover, the privacy interest at stake is too compelling to be outweighed
by low value speech appealing to nothing other than morbid curiosities. 23 1
To respond to this matter effectively, the presumption based test will
appropriately shift the burden of proof on the party deserving of greater
deference and protect our right to privacy while preserving the public's
right to know matters of legitimate concern.

229 Calvert, supra note 16, at 145.
230 See generally Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 905 (1972) (discussing an exception to
the First Amendment protection recognized in Chaplinsky that extends to offensive language that is
likely to offend the "sensibilities of an unwilling audience."); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 571 (1942) (noting that the right of freedom of speech is not absolute).
231 See, e.g., Melton v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 267 F. Supp. 2d 859, 865 (explaining that families
have a right not to be degraded by exposure to public view of a the remains of a family member); Miller
v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1492-93 (Cal. App. 1986) (holding that decedent's wife's
right to privacy prevailed over the First Amendment where an NBC news crew broadcast the decedent's
heart attack on the 6 p.m. and 11 p.m. news on channel 4 as part of a documentary on paramedics).

